

THE MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke*.

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MODERNISM AND POST-MODERNISM

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE EDITOR

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DEAR MAJOR,

When I wrote to you about your recent article in the *Modern Churchman*, with real gratitude and not a little embarrassment, you were kind enough to suggest that I might take the opportunity to contribute something on a subject which would have been premature some years ago, but which now is apposite: we called it 'Post-Modernism.' At the time I did not see my way to doing this; but I have since been thinking over your suggestion, and have come to the conclusion that I ought to make the attempt. Not only your own long loyalty to a cause which I had abandoned, but also my feeling of indebtedness to the Modern Churchmen's Union, and my belief that, during something like forty years of apparent estrangement, we have in fact been coming closer together, make me think that perhaps I should put on record my experience of the past, and my hopes for the future. I cannot share your generous belief that anything I can write will be 'not a voice from the dead past, but from the new world'; yet I hope it may have some interest for any who happen to be moving in the same direction.

Thirty-eight years ago I published the book on *Miracles in the New Testament* which started the controversy described in your article ('A Martyr of the Miraculous,' *Modern Churchman*, December, 1948). It was not a profound or philosophical treatment of the 'supernatural,' but a simple statement of the critical and historical case against the literal truth of the miracle-stories of the Gospels. There was nothing new in this, unless it was my insistence, against apologists of the *Lux Mundi* school, that all the miracle-stories stood or fell together; and my attempt to

show that the rejection of them left the essentials of Christian faith intact. The first contention, I believe, still stands, though it is in constant need of reassertion; and present-day apologists of the miraculous rest their case either on historical scepticism, or on the claim that subsequent Christian experience in some way proves the historical accuracy of the first Christian witnesses. The second contention, though I have not been able to realize it in my own experience, has undoubtedly become part of contemporary Christian belief, and is tacitly accepted, though not publicly professed, by many bishops and clergy.

But forty years ago, in the days of Gore and Weston, the 'Hereford scandal' and the Kikuyu controversy, this was not so: I found myself regarded by a small body of Churchmen as a martyr, and by the majority as a traitor. For some years I carried on, inhibited by certain bishops, but protected by my College. My only real enemy was my conscience, which, as I came to believe, deprived me of the right to recite the creeds and administer the sacraments. Since then I have remained outside the Church. I do not regard myself as a 'martyr': that name should be reserved for those who were not protected, as I was, by membership of an academic society, from the worldly penalties of clerical unorthodoxy; or who have sacrificed some of their opinions to what seems to them the more important duty of the ministry of souls; or who have been able to fall back on deeper convictions and experiences of the spiritual life.

The few years of theological controversy were swallowed up in the much more profound problems raised and changes brought about by the thirty years' war (as it will seem to future historians) of 1914-44. These problems and changes no longer concerned Miracles, or the Bible, or Christology, but the foundation of all religion, the existence and character of God. There can be few who lived through the period with their religious beliefs unchanged. Some whose belief in the divine government of the world was destroyed by their experiences have given up membership of any Church. Some who found it impossible to carry on without religious faith have been able to shelve its intellectual difficulties. Some whose need was for an authoritative society to guarantee and direct their faith have accepted the claims of an 'infallible' Catholicism, or of an apocalyptic Marxism. If I mention my own experience, it is only to explain what follows. My first feeling was that God had abdicated His government of the world, and left its control to the very forces against which religion had always protested; with the corollary that it lay within men's power, and was henceforth their only hope, to master and use

these forces and 'save their own souls.' My second feeling was that, whilst this must involve not merely science and socialism and education, but also art and religion and philosophy — I could not accept the historical claims of Christianity or the authority of the Church as final or exclusive embodiments of the part to be played by religion. Again, I have no doubt that my experience is common enough — so common, in greater or less degree, that the question before the Modern Churchmen's Union is no longer how to make Christianity acceptable to thinking people, but how to preserve religion at all in a world whose theology has been absorbed into feeling, experiencing, and living, and whose 'sense of sin' has been largely replaced by 'frustration.' Our enquiry must now be whether the 'religious sense' is really innate in man, whether, if and when it appears, it is a valid assurance of the existence of God; and whether faith or philosophy can show that this God is One whom we can and must worship. A restatement of Christianity that would meet this need might be called Post-Modernism.

'Human nature does not change.' We must not allow this half-truth to dictate an appeal only to the most primitive and unprogressive parts of our being. Human nature constantly changes, because it is constantly growing (history and science agree) towards greater integration of the lower instincts and passions through reason and social organization into finer and completer personalities. Religion springs from one of the oldest and therefore lowest strata of human nature, and can only be kept alive and useful by developing in and through every stage of man's growth. The philosopher may believe, the religious man must believe, that the sub-natural grows into the supernatural; that the life and reason which appear in it and urge it on towards ever completer humanity are divine; that the natural order coincides with the divine order; that reason and revelation are one. We are so made that we can only interpret this world-order from the human end. We can only study God in man. If we knew all there is to know about man, we should know all that we are capable of knowing about God. Here a Modern Churchman is on common ground with the philosopher, the scientist, and even the mystic, whose ecstasy is an advance from the contemplation of God in nature and man to the contemplation of God in Himself.

The Christian mystics have always insisted that the Immanence of God can only be saved from the dangers of Pantheism if it is combined with His Transcendence; and to common Christian experience this has always been the first article of faith—an article to be held to in spite of the difficulties it carries as regards determinism and the existence of evil. It has been assumed that these

perhaps insoluble problems can be brushed aside by a dogma or an act of faith. The importance of the present moment, I think is this: that, as the result of the social and intellectual changes of the war years, most people no longer believe in this *apologia* and cannot be brought back to belief in it. It is no longer a question, to my mind, of 'explaining away' the miracle-stories, or of 'humanizing' the divinity of Christ, but of putting the religious sense in its proper place in human experience, and showing how the idea of God is natural as the last term in the evolution of mind, and necessary as the final piece without which philosophy cannot reconstruct the puzzle of existence.

Do not suppose that I think every clergyman should become a philosopher, a psychologist, or a physicist. Far from it. Religion is a short cut, not to truth, but to the evidence of truth which lies in human nature. The clergyman, by his habitual access to the deepest and sincerest parts of human nature, should be like the doctor with his special knowledge of the body; he should have special knowledge of the soul—know what human nature really needs, is really worth; and upon this he must build his theology. I honestly do not know whether he can still be a Churchman, recite creeds which no longer express what he finds in his parishioners' minds, administer sacraments which they take for magic or sentimentalism, and teach moral standards which seem to them unreal. But I think that so long as he finds in Christ the truest and highest human nature (and that means the completest immanence of the divine), he can call himself a Christian and a believer in God. His philosophy, his view of the world, may enable him still to cling to the old Transcendence, and to see in this life a state of probation for a life beyond, with eternity a prize or a penalty for man's use of his free will. But he may find himself unable to call such a Being and such a world-order divine, and may come to regard the universe itself as a gradual development of a God who is not yet all He has it in Him to be, but is always and everywhere becoming; and eternal life as a state achieved here and now by every thought and act that shares in that growing divineness and anticipates its perfection.

The modernizing of religion has come in a succession of waves, sweeping away in turn idolatry, infallibility, and the miraculous—though the world is still strewn with relics of these beliefs. There remains the 'tenth wave' of Post-Modernism, which will sweep theology itself up to the high water mark of human experience.

Yours very sincerely,

J. M. THOMPSON.

SIGNS OF THE TIMES

THE BISHOPS AND MIRACLES.

In the Rev. J. M. Thompson's *Open Letter* published in this issue of the *Modern Churchman* its writer expresses the view that many of our English diocesan bishops to-day 'tacitly' hold that the rejection of the Biblical miracles leaves 'the essentials of Christian faith intact.' This may be true of the bishops, but our experience of their treatment of ordinands furnishes evidence to the contrary. Certainly some of our bishops do take the view that Mr. Thompson asserts and act accordingly. But there are a number who do not.

If it were possible, in view of the present intellectual situation, for all our diocesan bishops to consent to make this problem of the miraculous an open issue in the case of ordinands, we are convinced that the Christian Faith to-day would really lose nothing, but the influence of the Christian Church in the modern world would gain much.

In view of the statements of the New Testament in regard to the miraculous, and the consequent traditional attitude of the Christian Church for many centuries towards the miraculous, the Church authorities have no right to command Christian people to disbelieve in the historical character of the New Testament miracles; but, on the other hand, in view of the great difficulty, historical and scientific, which 'belief in the miraculous' involves for many modern-minded people, the Church to-day would be acting with real pastoral insight and sympathy if it decided to make the acceptance of miracles, or the rejection of miracles, an open issue and to do this not secretly but publicly. For ordinary Christians it is quite possible to-day, although fifty years ago it was not possible, to distinguish between the *fact* of the Incarnation and the *mode* of the Incarnation of Jesus Christ; as also between the *fact* of the Resurrection and the *mode* of the Resurrection.

Provided that faith in the *fact* of the Incarnation and faith in the *fact* of the Resurrection be affirmed by ordinands, the issue of the *mode* had far better be left an open question — historians, literary critics, psychologists, students of psychical phenomena may all be likely to differ, and continue to differ, as to the precise *mode*. But to-day we are able to realize that the open mind and reasonable discussion may be the best friends to vital Christian Faith.

If to-day our English episcopate would publish a statement that ordinands who affirm the supreme Divine Incarnation in Jesus Christ and also their belief in His Spiritual Resurrection, but who are unable to affirm as historic facts the miracles of the Virgin Birth and the Physical Resurrection, would not be refused Orders, our English bishops would be achieving a great advance in the ministry of reconciliation between modern science and Christian Faith. Even if all our bishops could not unite to do this now, yet, if some of them would unite to do this publicly, they would be doing not a little to strengthen the influence of the Christian Religion in modern life.

We hope that a number of our liberally-minded bishops, deeply concerned for the extension of the influence not only of the Christian Faith but also for the recovery of the influence of institutional Christianity, would take action at this critical moment. It is useless to propagate national missions which 'tacitly' ignore this fundamental issue. A policy where those behind cry forward and those in front cry back, need expect no victories, nor does it deserve any.

EUGENICS AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS:

For those who believe that true progress in civilization can only be secured by the partnership of Christian ethics and modern scientific knowledge, it is gratifying that the Galton Lecture for 1949 should be delivered by an English bishop, Dr. Barnes of Birmingham.¹ Although we suspect that Dr. Barnes is the first bishop to deliver the Galton Lecture, it was an English clergyman, T. R. Malthus, who laid the foundation of the scientific study of eugenics. This he did in his treatises on population published in 1798 and 1803.

The most influential exponent and supporter of the unwelcome conclusions of Malthus was John Stuart Mill, who, however, was not regarded as a Christian, although his definition of Christianity, 'So to live that Christ would approve our life,' is perhaps the best definition of our religion outside the New Testament. Even Malthus, although a curate, was not regarded as being on the side of the angels, except perhaps that as they 'neither marry nor are given in marriage,' they set an example which, if followed by a number of human beings, would conduce to human prosperity.

The particular theme of Dr. Barnes' Galton Lecture is *The Mixing of Races and Social Decay*. The rapid rate in the increase of human population (now estimated to be 2,200,000,000),

¹ The Galton Lecture delivered before the Eugenics Society on February 18th, 1949.

the no less rapidly diminishing area of new land available for the production of additional food supplies, the way in which modern methods of transit and transport are making neighbours of states and races until recently widely separated, are creating economic and ethical problems of a most formidable character. Increasing population, diminishing sources of sustenance, united to the neighbourly demand that those who have not should share with those who have, concern not only man's domestic and political life but the very existence of our civilization. Much apprehension is expressed by popular orators as to the part which the atomic bomb is to play in determining the future of mankind, but the far greater danger which our present eugenic situation involves is largely ignored. That danger is so vast and so various that both politicians and popes treat it with reserve. Yet, in one of its aspects, the eugenic problem is the problem of the last crust, and if the eugenic problem be not solved in the near future there will be a ferocity and finality in the prolonged struggle for the last crust which is more horrible to contemplate than a world-wide atomic explosion which will not even be consciously experienced by those whom it annihilates.

The eugenic problem is a problem for U.N.O. Yet to judge by the record of U.N.O. it is extremely unlikely that U.N.O. will face it, although prepared to discuss endlessly 'the raising of the standard of living' for mankind—a phrase, by the way, which would have meant for the Victorian Englishman a sterner recognition of the standards of duty and an increasing personal endeavour to give himself to the service of his fellows, but which has come to mean for us to-day a more ample and varied diet.

The mixing of races and social decay is one of many factors to be considered in the solution of the eugenic problem, but not a pressing one in comparison with the economic problem created by the pressure of vast oriental populations seeking entrance into sparsely inhabited regions occupied by non-oriental peoples.

Many years ago Australia courageously and energetically faced the situation when it carried through its policy of 'A White Australia.' This policy demanded the cessation of the importation of all black labour from Melanesia—a measure which threatened to ruin the sugar cane plantations of Queensland. It also prohibited all members of oriental races resident in Australia from becoming citizens of Australia. This policy received remarkably little sympathy from British political leaders, yet had Australia not carried out this policy in good time Australia and New Zealand would have been lost to British civilization in the late war.

It is not the inter-marriage of individuals belonging to different nationalities which menaces the advance of civilization to-day but the influx into our Nordic civilization of vast bodies of aliens with their alien civilizations. Christian inter-marriage between Europeans and members of other ancient civilizations, whether Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Arabian, can produce valuable offspring. It is not mixture of races but mixture of civilizations which is a real danger to human progress. Where, as Bishop Barnes holds, marriages are Christian marriages nothing is to be feared from racial intermixing. But where the sexual relations are not Christian, the results, especially in the case of the offspring, are detrimental.

After the publication of his Galton Lecture, Dr. Barnes delivered at Cambridge on May 12th the Rede Lecture, entitled *Religion and Turmoil*.² This brilliant presentation of our civilization and its problems also deals, in one of its aspects, with eugenics. The Bishop asks :

'How long will it be before mankind realizes that large families must henceforth be considered as a form of selfishness?' (p. 16).

Granted that the population of the world to-day ought not to be increased, can we feel secure that the right solution of our eugenic problems demands ethically that no one should have a large family? Granted that to-day in the interests of mankind the population of the world should not be increased, may it not be rightly urged that stationary population could achieve a much higher progressive civilization if the constituent ratios within that population were drastically altered? From the point of view of our future world-civilization the problem of population is not merely one of *quantity* but also one of *quality*. It is obvious, but alas invidious, that we could greatly diminish the number of some races not only without loss but with gain to the advance of civilization as a whole. This is equally true, of course, of different classes within all nations, *e.g.* the mentally deficient, physically unfit, the criminal, thriftless, shiftless, unemployable members of those races. It is in this sphere that the most difficult eugenic problems exist. Nature, so our biologists have urged, provides for the elimination of the unfit by 'the struggle for existence,' but modern humanitarianism and ecclesiastical tradition ignore and even oppose this ruthless struggle, and as a consequence encourage not only the survival but the propagation of the unfit. Here Christian ethics is faced with a tremendously complex problem. Does the Christian principle of love of our neighbour demand this

² Cambridge University Press ; 1/6.

humanitarian policy or the reverse? Thou shalt love thy neighbour *as thyself* commands a love which is not the slave of humanitarian emotionalism but is the agent of rational beneficence.

As to the production of large families, the decisive issue must be the *quality* of the family. J. S. Mill maintained that no man ought to have a child which he could not bring up at least as well as he himself had been brought up. It is this which ought to decide the size of a family. Of course if the State is to maintain and educate and employ all the children of the State, then the State must have the right to decide the number of children in each family, but until then the responsibility for the size of the family must rest on the parents.

Another important factor in determining the size of a family must be location. In Australia there is an obligation on Australian citizens to increase the size of their families, whereas presumably in London, India, China, Indonesia, Japan, Egypt it is otherwise.

These eugenic problems demand primarily solution by U.N.O. : the appointment of Commissions of eminent specialists who can be trusted on scientific grounds to take the longest and widest views.

The function of the Christian Church in dealing with the eugenic problem can at the present time be most effectively exercised by promoting the Christian ideal of marriage, the moral and spiritual education of children, the parental right and duty of philanthropic birth control by scientific methods.

TENEBRAE IN LONDON.

The *Church Times* of April 22nd, under the heading 'The Holiest Days at Graham Street,' publishes an account of the services held in the Church of St. Mary-the-Virgin, Pimlico, during the Good Friday season. We cite the following extracts :

St. Mary's, Pimlico, 'represents a special tradition : an unlaboured excellence in the performance, in a suitable baroque setting, of ceremonial and polyphonic music.'

'Liturgically and musically, Good Friday was as it should be, the climax of Holy Week. The church was full for the Veneration of the Cross and the Mass of the Presanctified Host—from the silent prostrations of the priests, flat before the bare sarcophagus-altar, to their abrupt, disorderly departure at the end : as the priests' shoes were put on again after their visit to the unveiled Cross, a nun marshalled the children of the parish to lead the congregation in the same triple reverence : a second Cross was offered to the faithful in a side aisle.'

'Late in the evening Tenebrae was sung (in the "Book of Common Prayer" version put out by the Society of SS. Peter and Paul). In the richly dramatic settings of the responsories, as, earlier in the day, in

Byrd's Reproaches and John of Portugal's *Crux Fidelis*, the choir was at its best.

'On Holy Saturday, as on Maundy Thursday, there is, as it were, a dialectic of white and purple, culminating in the golden triumph of Easter. This is the strangest, longest, most "functional" of the Church's liturgical services: the ornaments in use may include a ladder (by which the deacon may climb to fix the grains of incense in the paschal candle), an earthenware jug (for the distribution of the newly-blessed water), and even bellows (by whose insufflation the opening prayers, in blessing of the new flint-struck fire, were punctuated). Daffodils and narcissi, bunched about the triple taper on the reed, retold the Resurrection promise — fulfilled two hours later, when the Red Sea of the Prophecies had been crossed, and the great candle dipped thrice in the font, and the primitive litany chanted. Then, while the priests vested for the first Mass of Easter, with busy speed yet without haste, the scene was changed, the purple frontal whisked away, the Lenten veils stripped from the statues; so that, as the litany ended and the *Kyries* began, the priests could make their measured re-entry and the boys could be gripping their bells in time for the tremendous clangour with which they greeted Christ harrowing hell.'

The holding of these services with the public approbation of Dr. Wand, the Bishop of London, who himself gave the addresses on the Seven Words at the Three Hours Service, renders them peculiarly significant as indicating the strong position secured by pre-Reformation rites and ceremonial in the Metropolitan diocese of the Anglican Communion.

Without being Kensitites or adherents of the 'Protestant Underworld' in the Church of England, we cannot view without apprehension the episcopal patronage of such liturgical practices. That such services can secure a crowded congregation from among the vast population of the London diocese is no indication that their promotion is generally beneficial to our English Church life. The fact that the recent Laymen's Challenge to the Diocese of London proved to be (we use the phrase of a leading Church newspaper) an 'unmitigated flop,' suggests that what we gain on the swings we may lose on the roundabouts.

A vigorous and carefully organized mission has recently been implemented by the Bishop of London in order to recall indifferent and non-practising Christians to the need, not only of accepting the great essentials of the Christian Faith, but also of supplementing the same by practising membership in the Church of England. Are the 'goings on' at Pimlico at all likely to appeal to those men and women whom the Bishop's mission is seeking to recall?

It is of interest to observe that the ritual and ceremonial used at St. Mary's, Pimlico, was derived from the 'Book of Common Prayer' edited by the accomplished Jesuit, Fr. Ronald Knox, and published by the Society of SS. Peter and Paul. This publishing

firm originally described itself as 'publishers to the Church of England' but were compelled to renounce this claim. To judge from the pace at which our English ceremonial and ritual are approximating to pre-Reformation usage, such a distinction should be needless a few years hence.

DISESTABLISHMENT UNDER THE COUNTER.

The Church Assembly, like the Presbyterian preacher of whom one of his disgruntled congregation complained 'If there is an ill text in the Bible he's aye sure to tak' it,' has decided to deal with Reform in the relations of Church and State.

There is no desire for reform in this sphere either by the politicians or by the rank and file of Churchmen — Liberal and Evangelical. It is the Anglo-Catholics who desire it. The present method of appointing bishops holds up the complete domination of the Church by the Anglo-Catholic party and the ultimate entry of that English Church into the *limina apostolorum*.

For some years past the agitation for complete Disestablishment has been losing ground in Anglo-Catholic circles. When it became clear, on the one hand, that Disestablishment must include Disendowment, and, on the other hand, that it must involve a new constitution for the Church of England (which, if the Church were to hold property, would have to be embodied in an Act of Parliament), judicious Anglo-Catholics, like the late William Temple, became convinced that the Church had more important work to do than by tinkering with its constitution.

What, then, has seduced the Church Assembly into embarking on its policy of Church Disestablishment under the Counter — in other words, independence of State control combined with the Church's retention of its vast endowments?

A group of able and influential Anglo-Catholic leaders, including one Archbishop and three very eminent laymen, have been developing a 'Catholic' policy of Church reform which includes the authorization of a revised Church liturgy, revised Church canons, revised Church courts and a revised method of appointing diocesan bishops. All these proposed measures are highly controversial, and it is more than doubtful whether Parliament will sanction them although the Church Assembly, with its large Anglo-Catholic membership, is sure to pass them unless the majority of the bishops exercise their veto under the leadership of the Archbishop of Canterbury.

We cannot now, as Modern Churchmen, repeat our objections to Lord Selborne's resolution carried by the Church Assembly in its recent session. Our objections, presented historically and

judicially, have been set forth by the late Sir Lewis Dibdin, Dean of the Arches, in his volume *Establishment in England* (published by Macmillans, 1932; 7/6). Our objections, in a much more popular form, can be read in Lord Charnwood's criticism of Lord Selborne's proposals summarized in the *Modern Churchman* of March, 1936 (Vol. xxv, pp. 661-3).

We propose instead to cite the most recent criticism of the Church Assembly policy from two points of view, neither of which would be described as modernist.

The Bishop of Chelmsford in the *Chelmsford Diocesan Chronicle* of April and May, 1949, delivers himself as follows:

'At the last group of Sessions of the Church Assembly a full-dress discussion of the Disestablishment of the Church of England was staged, based upon a resolution of a leading lay member, Mr. G. W. Currie.'

'I confess it left me amazed that an incredibly foolish policy like this could be seriously discussed in this unpracticable fashion. Of course every sensible person knows that a grave moral issue might bring the Church into collision with the State. In this case Disestablishment would be a spiritual necessity. . . . But that is a different matter from the looking for trouble which distinguished most of the speeches in this debate.'

'The debate struck me as poor and unreal and distinguished by arguments largely based on imaginary grievances.'

'Our financial position is quite desperate, and few appear to realize it. . . . This is the time for patient and constructive repair of our finances and no time for heroics.'

'It sounds so entirely reasonable to ask that the Church may be permitted to manage its own affairs that simple people are easily led astray. The ugly fact is that no body, secular or religious, which holds property can by any device be entirely independent of the State.'

'The most serious aspect of the case is still to be noted. The Commission to examine this matter will in due course present a Report to the Church Assembly. This Report will no doubt be approved and the Church will thus be *officially committed* to a particular policy of reform from which it will be impossible to retreat without disastrous "loss of face." On the basis of the Report an approach will then be made to the State, and at once a violent agitation will be fomented by the same groups of people within and without the Church who were chiefly responsible for the Prayer Book *débacle*.'

'It seems an amazing thing that the Church of England should be hustled into a disastrous course of action after a few hours' discussion of a number of conflicting resolutions moved by people for the most part quite irresponsible.'

We now turn to our second piece of Church testimony. Canon Vidler of St. George's, Windsor, a very responsible Churchman and possessed of understanding sympathy for the Anglo-Catholic point of view, shares the Bishop of Chelmsford's desire to let well enough alone, but recognizes that should the Church Assembly follow the leadership of the Archbishop of York

'it will before long ask for such modifications as would enable the Church to revise its forms of worship and its canon law, to set up a system of

church courts, and to have a more direct say in the appointment of bishops.'

Of these proposals Canon Vidler writes in the *Christian News-Letter* of April, 1949 :

'Nevertheless, *pace* the motion of the Church Assembly, it is doubtful whether the Church of England is really impeded in the fulfilment of its responsibilities as a spiritual society by the present form of its relationship to the State as much as may appear to be the case on paper. The attempt to secure legal modifications of this relationship may only divert attention from more serious impediments and weaknesses.

'PRAYER BOOK REVISION

'Take, for example, the revision of the Church's forms of worship. If the Church in 1927-8 had been able to produce a revised Book of Common Prayer behind which there were general agreement and eager conviction, there is no reason to suppose that Parliament would have impeded its adoption and use. . . .

'The inability of the Church to agree about what it wants may not be such a disadvantage as appears at first sight. . . . The fact is, however, that the Church of England has so far been no more successful than other Churches in discovering ways of public worship that bite into the consciousness of contemporary man. . . . The impediment here is not so much that traditional liturgical language is not understood by the people as that the accepted Christian images, paradigms and archetypes are no longer alive and powerful in men's imaginations. . . . It is possible that a revision of the Prayer Book, if it were feasible now, would foster the illusion that this fundamental impediment had been overcome, when it has scarcely been perceived.

'APPOINTMENT OF BISHOPS

'The nomination of bishops by the King on the recommendation of the Prime Minister raises other questions. But it is not clear that the work of the Church of England would be eased or benefited by a modification of the present arrangement. . . . While like all other arrangements it can be, and has been, abused, a case can be made out for the view that this is a point at which the State can assist the Church better than the Church can assist itself. . . . Ecclesiastical purists and enthusiasts are often blind to the ways in which original sin operates in their proceedings, and are reluctant to acknowledge that there may be tasks which the civil magistrate, who is also a minister of God, is in a better position to perform for the Church. If this is so, it will explain why, as is usually allowed, the English method, despite its anomalies, works better than electoral methods that are followed elsewhere.

'If it be said that a Prime Minister might abuse his office by making purely political appointments without regard to the interests of the Church, it can be replied that in modern times, with rare exceptions, Prime Ministers, whatever their political or ecclesiastical allegiance, have served the Church in a singularly disinterested manner. In any case, the Church always has in its own hands a certain check, which could easily, and would certainly, be brought into operation if the need arose. While Prime Ministers can nominate bishops, they cannot consecrate them. The consecration of bishops is entirely within the Church's own province.

'The present form of establishment has admittedly the nature of a makeshift. The time will come, sooner or later, for a new religious

settlement in England. That time will obviously have come if or when a union of Churches is brought about. . . . The Church Assembly need be less troubled about the present form of the Church's relationship with the State than about its lack of relation with large and growing areas of the national life. The Archbishop of York has stated that "most Churchmen feel that some change in the relations between Church and State is urgently required." We doubt if this is so, but if it is they should be told that a weak Church does not become a strong Church by manipulating, still less by tinkering with, ecclesiastical or political machinery, but by reaching out into places where there are deaf ears and blind eyes waiting to be opened.'

In view of the dangerous situation which has been created by the Church Assembly's resolution it seems to us to be a matter of urgent importance to secure at the earliest possible moment the abandonment of this ill-advised policy of Church Disestablishment under the Counter.

In the days before the creation of the Church Assembly the Primate willingly consented to receive deputations of Churchmen concerned with important controversial issues of Church policy. In view of the inadequately representative character of the Church Assembly there seems to us to be no reason why the Primate should not consent to receive such deputations to-day either with the inclusion or exclusion of the Press. This, we believe, would be a better method than the presentation of a signed memorial to the Primate followed by publication in the Press. What, however, is clear is that if action is to be taken it should be initiated at once.

REFORM OF PAROCHIAL PATRONAGE.

The Church Assembly of late years has been concerned with the implementing of a number of legislative reforms which have so far been productive of more apprehension than satisfaction among loyal and understanding sons of the Church of England. We do not question that there is need of Church reform, but the choice of the Assembly in the things which it selects for reformation seems to many unfortunate.

For instance, it is hard to understand why the Crown should not be permitted to appoint to bishoprics clergymen above 55 years of age when a number of the ablest administrators in the State are appointed over this age.

At the present time there is urgent need for the reform of parochial patronage. Bishops, parishioners and parochial patrons are acutely aware of this when unimportant, isolated and poorly endowed parishes have to be filled. Augmenting the incomes of poor incumbents by grants from diocesan and central funds, and

the grouping together of poor parishes so as to constitute larger pastoral units, are inadequate methods and in some cases even detrimental. The real remedy can only be found in a thorough reform of our parochial patronage system which will place on the parishioners themselves responsibility for the adequate maintenance of their parochial clergy. Such a reform would prove as beneficial to the parishioners as it would be to the parochial clergy and would thus do much to strengthen the influence of the Church as a whole.

Canon E. W. Watson, Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History, Oxford, maintained that in the Church of England the real unit is not the province nor the diocese but the parish, and that the vitality of the Church depends upon the efficiency of its parochial system and the quality of the parson of the parish.

Our present parochial patronage system possesses two valuable qualities: 1, great variety in its methods of appointment; 2, that a large number of its patrons are laymen. Patronage reform should not only retain but augment both these beneficial factors.

The reform proposals to which we venture here to direct the attention of Churchmen generally and the Church Assembly in particular are largely based upon our experience of the administration of parochial patronage in the Anglican communion overseas. Every fully constituted parish ought to possess a patronage board. This board should consist of four members:

The first being the present patron or his representative;

The second being the people's churchwarden;

The third being a resident parishioner elected at the annual meeting of parishioners and designated the 'parochial nominator';

The fourth being a layman, resident in the Rural Deanery, elected by the ruri-decanal conference and designated the 'diocesan nominator.'

When a parochial vacancy occurs this board should be notified by the Archdeacon, who will at the same time request the people's warden to summon a meeting of the parishioners, at which meeting the Archdeacon himself will discuss with the parochial patronage board and with the parishioners how best to fill the vacancy. At this meeting the Archdeacon, who himself presides, will try to secure the fullest and frankest expression of the parishioners' desires and needs: he will also lay before the parishioners precise information of the official income of the incumbency and the various charges, *e.g.* dilapidations, etc., for

which the incumbent is liable. Where the incumbent's stipend is so small as to make it exceedingly unlikely that a new incumbent can be obtained of the kind desired by the parishioners, he should seek to secure a definite understanding from the parishioners as to what steps they propose to take to provide an adequate stipend, and he will urge the parochial patronage board to secure as adequate an income as possible, guaranteed by the parish, as a preliminary to their nominating a desirable clergyman to fill the vacancy. Where three members of the board are agreed on the clergyman to be nominated and have his consent to the nomination, the diocesan bishop will be requested to institute him to the benefice. Should the bishop have conscientious objections to instituting the clergyman nominated to him by the parochial patronage board, he must give his reasons in writing both to the board of parochial nominators and to the clergyman nominated.

Where, however, the parochial patronage board is unable to secure a clergyman to fill the vacancy, then it shall be the sole duty of the patron of the parish to nominate, and should he fail to do this within a limited period then it becomes the duty of the diocesan bishop to fill the vacancy.

The system of parochial patronage here proposed not only gives the parochial laity a very real power in the appointment of their parish priests, but also it lays an important financial responsibility on the parishioners to provide an adequate stipend for their parson. It is much better, where the parishioners are financially in a position to do this, that the parson's stipend should be adequately supplemented in this way than by grants from a diocesan or central fund, or by uniting the unwilling parish to a neighbouring parish for the purpose of securing an adequate stipend.

Of course if the parishioners do not respond or cannot respond to the financial appeal made to them to supplement adequately their incumbent's stipend they cannot justly blame the diocesan authorities if their parish is incorporated in a neighbouring parish. Such a reform in our parochial patronage system would, we believe, do much and in the best way to strengthen the financial position of the Church, and not least where it is most needed; and would, we hope, check, if not abolish, increasing Church central appeals for local church purposes.

CAN CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATION SURVIVE?

By the REV. J. C. HARDWICK, M.A., B.Sc.

SUCH a question would hardly have been asked fifty, or even forty, or perhaps thirty, years ago; and, if asked, would certainly have been answered with a confident affirmative—save by a very few far-sighted people. To-day, on the contrary, everyone who troubles to think at all is asking precisely this question, and any affirmative answers that are given are hedged about with reservations and conditions.

Bishop Barry of Southwell is asking the question, and though he gives his book an optimistic title,¹ *Recovery of Man*, the writer appears to have very few illusions about the situation in which modern man finds himself.

‘One of the salient facts of the present moment,’ he writes, ‘is the co-existence of hope with despair—but the former seems now to be waning rapidly. . . . Considering people are more and more conscious of the sound of the breakers. Indeed a dreadful sense of foreboding seems to eclipse the light in our skies. Many believe that civilization is about to perish.’

He sees ‘signs of profound spiritual malaise and deepening demoralization,’ and envisages the possibility that our civilization ‘has now become exhausted.’ The question is whether there are still available ‘recreative and renewing powers which can avert imminent disaster and give man promise of recovery.’ The trouble is that the ‘progressive’ elements in our society, from which so much has been hoped, are in no sense ‘creative’—that is to say, they seem to have no power to produce anything *new*; all they can do, apparently, is to reorganize things and make them, so to speak, more ‘efficient.’ But this does not lead anywhere; it only means acceleration of a process which, for all we know, may be a destructive one.

Hence all the disillusionment amongst our idealists. They ‘looked for righteousness, but behold a cry.’

‘The revolutions have not produced, as was predicted, a classless society, but a different and more ruthless class-warfare, and a new, but more cynical, privilege of caste. There is nothing to show that leftist régimes are more peace-loving or more law-abiding or less “imperialistic” than their predecessors—the evidence points in the opposite direction. Nor, because we know so much more than our fathers, have

¹ *Recovery of Man*, by F. R. Barry. (Nisbet; 8/6.)

we gained any deeper illumination, spiritual humility and reverence, or responsibility in the use of knowledge. . . . Not all the new apparatus of living or the things that we have can change what we are.'

The point of breakdown to-day, our author remarks, alike in its thinking, its ethics and its politics, is 'the elimination of the personal.' External conditions count for more and more, personality for less and less. Things and processes have won control, and personal life is constantly invaded. The taste for liberty evaporated before the fatal attractions of collectivism, of the Welfare State, of getting something for nothing. The infiltration of the automaton affects every human activity, from industry to amusements. In a mechanical age, men cannot resist mechanization; and the unique individual is converted into the interchangeable unit.

There is indeed present with us a 'crisis of the human person,' and an interesting volume has recently been published with that title.² In it the author summarizes and examines the views of various modern writers who offer diagnoses of our ailments, and, in some cases, indications of where to look for cures. The list is an imposing one, and includes Berdyaev, Lewis Mumford, Koestler, Laski, Aldous Huxley, Gerald Heard, C. S. Lewis, Herbert Read and Mr. Middleton Murry.

Berdyaev, like his compatriot Dostoevsky, takes the view that men fear freedom and the responsibilities it entails. They have various ways of enslaving themselves which actually disguise the enslavement. Man is the victim of deterministic theory and also of industrial technique, the two being in fact correlatives, technique being mechanistic theory put into practice. This has been stressed in a book written ten years ago in Germany and recently translated and published in America.³ In it the author writes:

'The organizing force of technology grows apace with the advancement of technology, for mechanization of work and mechanization of human organization are inseparably bound together. The automatism that produces the technical product can work unhampered only if the workman also is subjected by a parallel organization to a like automatism, an automatism in which every one of his motions is repeated monotonously.

'There are clever devices which force him to work and control his work at the same time. Among these devices are the assembly line, which was first introduced in the slaughterhouses of Chicago, and control devices of various kinds. . . . Such technical procedures are gaining ground everywhere' (p. 71).

² *The Crisis of the Human Person*, by J. B. Coates. (Longmans; 12/6.)

³ *The Failure of Technology*, by F. G. Juenger. (Henry Regnery Co., Hinsdale, Illinois.)

Technical thinking, full of unshakable faith in organization, acts imperiously, promoting and expanding organization in all directions, and engulfing everybody. That this leads to a mushroom growth of bureaucracy (bureaucrats are really machine-minders), and to a new 'managerial class,' has become distressingly obvious. Mr. Coates very properly devotes one of his chapters to James Burnham, author of *The Managerial Revolution*, one of the most disturbing books of our day. Socialist opinion has always assumed that capitalism would sooner or later be superseded by some arrangement controlled by, and for the benefit of, the workers. But according to Burnham's analysis capitalism will be succeeded, not by democratic Socialism, but by despotisms unparalleled in history for power and efficiency. If civilization consists in technological perfection, no doubt the Managerial State could be described as civilized. But this culture would in reality be a form of barbarism. Science might indeed flourish, for its techniques would be necessary, for production, for propaganda, for the ruthless exploitation of natural resources, for the refinement of methods of repression, and so on.

It is clear that Bishop Barry is wholly justified in declaring that the present drift away from religious conviction and practice is due in large measure to 'sociological pressures.' Men become 'conditioned' by their environment and its suggestions so as to become 'just non-religious and apparently incapable of religion.' The social and economic trends of modern industrial civilization are inimical to the higher activities of spirit. And in aesthetic as well as in religious perception the populace is becoming vulgarized and demoralized. Nor is it at all a fantastic supposition to hold that all this widespread demoralization and inoculation against religion is being deliberately fostered by those whose interest and concern it is to destroy among the masses all loyalties save that to their secular masters who flatter, exploit and enslave them.

Our *intelligentsia* no doubt take the view that it is intellectual difficulties that are the obstacle which fences off the industrial masses from religion. The trouble is that these superior persons know little or nothing about our proletariat, the lives they live, their leading interests, the ideas that enter their heads, their credulity, their sentimentality, the ease with which they can be and are bamboozled, amused, flattered, debauched. The Bishop of Southwell has no illusions about the mental attitude of large sections of our population, sections which extend far beyond what are known as the 'working classes.'

'To-day it is only a very small minority who are capable of consciously thought-out reasoning. Advertising rests on the assumption

that "anything goes" if you say it often enough. People are at once sceptical and credulous, and are only too easily exploited by mass suggestion and high-power propaganda, whether by politicians, or pill-vendors, or anti-God orators. This is the gravest impediment to religion. For the enemy of religious conviction is not thought-out and reasoned agnosticism but the passive credulity of the vacant mind.'

This is true enough, and the irreligion of large sections of our population is not due to intellectual scruples arising from careful thought, so much as from what the Bishop calls 'sociological pressures.' But it should be remembered that these pressures are hostile not only to religion but to the spiritual side of life in general. They are not themselves an ultimate cause, but are themselves results of something more deep-seated; they are symptoms, not the disease itself.

What is it that 'emancipates popular thought from all transcendentalities'? Is it not the regarding of the universe and everything in it as a machine? Carried to its logical extreme this view extrudes individuality and personality even from the human being. And it is no accident that modern technology, which is a by-product of the mechanical view of nature, does actually reduce man to the status of a machine; he becomes in actual practice what he has been reduced to in theory.

The mechanical view of nature is perfectly simple; there lies its fatal attraction. It is the product of the natural sciences as these have developed during the last three centuries; and the natural sciences are the product of a particular way of looking at the world — namely, *the looking at it from outside*, taking the external view. Looked at thus, a man is a physico-chemical mechanism, and can be understood as such, and reduced thereto absolutely without remainder.

Looked at from inside, from the side of self-consciousness, he is, of course, something quite different, and every man is instinctively aware of this; this knowledge is 'given,' it is just 'there,' present to all of us. Here one touches reality, something concrete and not, as *l'homme machine* is, an abstraction.

This is not to say that the results of scientific research in the various fields necessarily lead to an atheistic materialism. And if it be the case, as Lord Acton declared, that unbelief is founded on science,⁴ that is all the more reason for examining the bearings of science upon religion, and producing an apologetic based upon

⁴ 'For 200 years, from the time of Hobbes, unbelief has been making its way. . . . Unbelief came to be founded on science. . . . About one half of the classic writing, of the creative thinking of the world, was done by unbelievers. The influences that reigned were in great measure atheistic.' From a letter written in 1891, quoted by Franck, *Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth*, p. 20.

data provided by the natural sciences. An apologetic work of outstanding merit along these lines exists in Bishop Barnes' Gifford Lectures for 1927-29: *Scientific Theory and Religion: the World Described by Science and its Spiritual Interpretation*.⁵

To approach God through the scientific study of nature at the present time is necessary if those whose training and outlook is primarily scientific are to be convinced. Also, it has to be remembered that large numbers of people with no particular scientific training have a working knowledge of theories such as biological evolution and the uniformity of nature; so that an apologetic which takes no account of the external world as interpreted by science is unlikely to impress them.

At the same time, some doubt is permissible whether to approach *via* the external world something that is so closely connected with the inner world of self-consciousness, is not to take a route which, though it may lead to the objective, is nevertheless an indirect one. Reason, indeed, as St. Augustine insisted,⁶ is the instrument with which man interrogates and understands his experience. But it is too often assumed, and especially, perhaps, in scientific circles, that what is termed sense experience — of the 'external' world⁷ — is the only truly reliable and 'objective' experience that a man can have, because it is possible to say, with reasonable certainty, what it is experience *of*. Whereas, in the case of 'inner' experiences, it is impossible to be sure that these are not wholly 'subjective' and therefore illusory. But though it may be difficult to say what an 'inner' experience is *of*, the truth is that there is an equal difficulty involved in knowing what an 'outer' experience is *of*. Even the physicist cannot tell us with any certainty. To suggest that 'inner' experiences are not experiences of something real is a gratuitous assumption, even though it may be a convenient one for those who wish us to believe that the 'external' world (whatever that may be — and no one really knows) is everything.

⁵ In view of this, Bishop Barry's misjudgment of Dr. Barnes' latest volume, which he describes as an attempt to meet the difficulties of the modern mind 'by exhibiting the nature of Christianity within the framework of nineteenth-century Naturalism,' is to be regretted. The Naturalism of that period was atheistic, while Dr. Barnes makes it plain in both works that he is a convinced theist.

⁶ An illuminating analysis of Augustine's standpoint is an important feature of Mr. J. V. Langmead Casserley's recent book, *The Christian in Philosophy*. (Faber & Faber; 18/-.)

⁷ How far this world is in reality wholly 'external' is a question too often shelved. The philosophical difficulties involved by so regarding it are insuperable.

The empirical scientific method as we know it to-day did not exist in Augustine's time; nevertheless his approach to the problems of religious truth was empirical, since it started from experience — not indeed of the external world, but of the inner world — that of self-consciousness (here Descartes was his disciple). 'In order to know God,' he said, 'do not go outside yourself, but return into yourself. The dwelling-place of truth is in the inner man.' In his view, immediate self-consciousness is not a consciousness of self alone; self-consciousness is also God-consciousness.

'This insistence that Christian theism is primarily a metaphysic of self-consciousness,' writes Mr. Casserley, 'rather than a metaphysic of nature, is one of the two ways of understanding and expressing Christian philosophy which run side by side, and in strong contrast with each other, throughout the later history of Christian thought.'

This Augustinian tradition was taken up by Anselm — a tradition according to which what is required is not so much a proof that God exists as a demonstration of the fact that we know Him already, and that this prior knowledge is 'the essential precondition of the significance and validity of all other kinds of knowledge.' Thus the Christian philosophy strives to supply a more lucid and discursive apprehension of truths of which the inquirer was in some sense aware already.

'Christian philosophy for Anselm does not mean a dialectical process which begins with everyday, external and commonsense things, whose reality is accepted at their face value, and then proceeds to demonstrate certain less evident, or perhaps even entirely unknown, truths. Rather it discovers one experience, our inward experience of God given in and through our self-consciousness, to be supremely revealing and significant among all other experiences; and then goes on to interpret all other experiences in terms of it. God is not known through nature, but nature is known in God.'

Mr. Casserley suggests that Aquinas's criticism of Anselm's famous Ontological Argument arose from the fact that the two men were thinking in different terms. 'For Anselm the idea of God is not an idea at all in St. Thomas' conceptual sense, but a vivid apprehension.' Indeed, Aquinas's day was much more like our own, since in the thirteenth century there now existed an independent science, Aristotle in Islamic dress, so that (1) Christianity was on the defensive, and (2) the external world rather than the world of the inner consciousness was the centre of intellectual interest.

The intellectual temper of the present age is much closer to the Aristotelian outlook of the thirteenth century renaissance than it is to that of Augustine and Anselm with their Platonic lack of interest in the external world around them. And whether it is possible at this hour of the day to switch back to a standpoint

whose interest lies in the world of interior consciousness, is questionable. Yet there are signs of a change of outlook. The first is a widespread interest in the new and perhaps still immature science of psychology; and the second is a new interest, not indeed so widespread, but nevertheless noticeable, in nature; regarding it not as a soulless mechanism, but as something alive and somehow congruous with ourselves — a view extending to cover even the inanimate parts of nature, or what are usually regarded as such. It is indeed the case that much modern psychology is as mechanistic as physics, and behaviourism banishes consciousness altogether. But this type of psychology is an interpretation *ab extra* of something which can only be truly known *ab intra*. It proposes that 'we should forget that we know ourselves internally as persons in order that we should know ourselves externally as bits of nature.'

What is really needed to-day, as Mr. Christopher Dawson points out in his Gifford Lectures,⁸ is a new sort of Natural Theology, not of the kind developed by writers of the Archdeacon Paley school—excellent though that may have been, and effective in its day—but one that goes rather deeper into things, taking cognisance of forms of experience and states of consciousness which the 'commonsense' attitude of the eighteenth century, the classic period of the older type of Natural Theology, was apt to overlook and, in its loathing of 'enthusiasm,' to misunderstand or despise.

Pascal's remark, 'The heart has its reasons of which the head knows nothing,' was not the utterance of an emotionalist or sentimentalist, but of a man whose intellect amounted to genius. The saying is to be taken, rather, as an indication that his consciousness or awareness in the field of religion reached heights and depths far beyond the range of those who, however 'enlightened,' are more modestly equipped with spiritual insight.

'Religion,' Mr. Christopher Dawson reminds us, 'does not arise from the experience of men like Archdeacon Paley, but from that of men like Ruysbroeck, and the thought of Ruysbroeck is more genuinely Natural Theology than is the thought of Paley, even though it may be less communicable and less adapted to logical discussion.'

'For religion has its origin in the depths of the soul, and it can be understood only by those who are prepared to take the plunge. It may be, as Jacobi said, a *salto mortale*, but it is not, as he supposed, a leap from knowledge to faith.'

That there is a difference between the discursive reason and the intuition of the mystic may indeed be admitted; but the difference is not that between knowledge and faith, still less that between natural and supernatural, but between the two levels of

⁸ *Religion and Culture*. (Sheed & Ward; 10/6.)

consciousness. This point made by Mr. Christopher Dawson is a most important one; and his contention that a comprehensive Natural Theology should take cognisance of the deliverances of these higher levels of consciousness is perfectly sound. No doubt if, as some people insist, these deliverances are only forms of sub-rational mental activity, then the essential phenomena of religion can be studied only psychologically or pragmatically, and no philosophic conclusions can be drawn from them. But if they do represent a form of genuine knowledge, then there is room for a science of religious truth, and for a new and more comprehensive Natural Theology, one which takes a synoptic view of all experience and knowledge, and not only of a more or less commonplace section—the least common multiple of human powers of perception. Prophetic inspiration, for example, will be one of the elements to be taken into account in the formation of such a Natural Theology. One of the most interesting sections of this interesting volume deals with the doctrines of one who did work out a Natural Theology of this kind, namely the Moslem philosopher Al Ghazali (1058-1111), who like St. Augustine studied religious phenomena not from outside, but from personal experience. According to the Spanish scholar Palacios, Aquinas owed much to Al Ghazali. There is little doubt, too, that the later Spanish mystics, St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross, drank from this well, as also from Islamic erotic poetry.

It goes without saying that a Natural Theology taking into account the experiences of prophet, saint, poet and mystic, would not neglect the knowledge which the natural sciences have given us of the outer world. Such a theology, dealing not only with the past but with the present, and taking that synoptic view of all experience and all knowledge, is what the modern world requires if ever the Christian religion is to regain the influence which it seems rapidly to be losing.

‘There is no necessary reason why a synthesis should not be possible between a scientific world civilization and a universal and transcendent religion. On the contrary, there is a natural affinity between the scientific ideal of the organization and rationalization of the material world by human intelligence, and the religious ideal of the ordering of human life to a spiritual end by a higher law which has its source in the Divine Reason.’

That is an inspiring utterance. Bishop Barry in his book lays stress upon Christianity being the Gospel of the Resurrection. And this, of course, is just the point: Has the Christian religion the power of resurrection in it? Can it be ‘born again’?

ARCHBISHOP WHATELY

By H. R. CHILLINGWORTH

RICHARD Whately, the youngest of nine children, was a son of the Rev. Dr. Joseph Whately, of Nonsuch Park, Surrey. He was born on February 1st, 1787, and died on October 8th, 1863. Four years before his birth Britain lost her American colonies, and during most of the years of his childhood, youth, and early manhood the country was at war with her 'natural enemy,' France — France, which young William Wordsworth in 1790 found

'Standing on the top of golden hours,'

but which Edmund Burke, in the same year, vehemently denounced in *Reflections on the French Revolution*. The golden hours were soon followed by the cloudy and dark day of the Terror, and when Burke died in 1798 Britain had still to face seventeen years of Gallic menace.

The fame of Nelson and Wellington, saviours of their country (and of much besides), is safe, and so is the fame of the poets of that period. And if Whately had been an original thinker, as Bentham was, his fame, as well as his name, would have lasted to our time. But Whately was a skilful user of other men's thoughts rather than an originator. He was a born teacher. Ability to see particulars against the background of a general principle, and to cite parallels whose inconsistency with the general principle would be patent to all, enabled him, as it enabled Socrates, to expose absurdities. With Socrates, the Socrates of the *Apology* and of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Whately would have got on excellently, but the Platonic Socrates would have bored him. He had a Roman preference for the practical, and as a philosopher he was therefore much more concerned with ethics than with metaphysics. Oxford introduced him to Aristotle, and in his letters one seems to come on quotations from the *Nicomachean Ethics* more often than from any other classic.

Whately was, however, neither antique Roman nor Greek. He had too kind a heart (and a too lively sense of the ridiculous) to have been a typical Roman, and his practical mind would have found ancient Athens an uncomfortable environment. He was a typical Englishman, if ever there was one—a Johnsonian Englishman; and it was no doubt some of his Johnsonian characteristics

that made appreciation of his worth so slow a growth in Ireland—even among the Anglo-Irish, with whom he lived for over thirty years. He was brusque and unceremonious, and in Ireland his theological views were an additional hindrance to mutual understanding. He attached himself to no party, ecclesiastical or political, but Liberalism was unmistakable in his attitude to Church and State. He might have been for Johnson a ‘bottomless Whig,’ but his feet were as firmly planted on the ground as Johnson’s. In their attitude to the Universe both men might be described as religious Positivists: they believed that the Universe was fundamentally divine, but the problems which Mother Earth presented were so numerous and so pressing that they were seldom tempted to investigate ultimates. Perhaps Whately’s disinclination to undertake anything which, in the nature of things, he would be unable to finish—a disinclination which, according to his daughter, prevented him from keeping a journal—had something to do with his avoidance of such investigations. Moreover, like Johnson, he suffered (if we are to accept his own diagnosis) from constitutional indolence. Johnson thought that ‘a young man should read five hours a day,’ but confessed that he himself had ‘never persisted in any plan (of study) two days together.’ Whately made a similar confession. He was willing to accept the professorship of Political Economy at Oxford in 1829, but not because ‘he had a fancy for it’; it was entertaining, he wrote, to read his friend Senior’s lectures on economics, or to converse with intelligent companions, but ‘such was his natural laziness . . . that no taste for any subject ever did, or (he believed) ever would, bring him to set to *work* and systematically master it. . . . Never had he *studied* any subject—never had he, properly speaking, done any manner of *work*, except either from necessity or a sense of duty.’ (The exceptional conditions, we may be sure, were not rare.) In later years he wrote: ‘A great work is a thing I have never undertaken. Anyone examining the formidable array of my writings, would find that all the most considerable have grown from sermons, lectures, etc., which I was called on to deliver, and which I then published with some additions.’

Whately was 42 years of age when he made the first of these confessions. A feeble and delicate childhood had been followed by a vigorous manhood. He was tall, strong, and masterful. As a boy he had been to a large extent thrown on his own resources. His brothers, most of them, were much older, and, boy-like, troubled little about their young brother’s feelings. He is described as being ‘shy, timid, and retiring.’ At nine years of age, in accordance with barbarous custom, he was sent to school, the

place of his exile being in the Bristol neighbourhood. His father, who was a Bristol prebendary, may have known something about the school, but as he died soon after Richard's entrance, his knowledge did not help his little son much. Richard's mother removed from Surrey to Bath, and home ties, one hopes, were somewhat strengthened. But Richard, though shy and timid, was tough; he was no William Cowper or Percy Shelley. He was fond of natural history, and the school rules seem to have allowed him to indulge his hobby. At home he had studied the ways of spiders, learnt the songs of birds, and made pets of ducklings, which he used to carry to a cabbage patch and feed on snails. At school he had to do without ducklings, and he found that he had lost a mysterious skill which had enabled him to make difficult calculations without the aid of pencil and paper. When this aid was supplied, progress in arithmetic became slow; at school and later he regarded himself as 'a perfect dunce at ciphering.'

In 1805 (the year of Trafalgar and Austerlitz) Whately went to Oxford, 'that magnificent and venerable seat of Learning, Orthodoxy, and Toryism,' as it was to Boswell when he visited the University with Dr. Johnson twenty-one years before. It cannot have been much different when young Whately entered Oriel. The French Revolution had taken place in the meantime, but, however much that upheaval affected the Continent, it had next to no effect on the pattern of English life. Britannia had got over her growing-pains in the seventeenth century, and, whatever sympathy may have been stirred in her by the growing-pains of her southern neighbour, disgust mingled with alarm destroyed all neighbourly feeling when the government of France fell into the hands of bloody-minded fanatics. Wordsworth and the other francophiles of 1790 had settled into respectability and political orthodoxy before 1805.

The atmosphere of the eighteenth century still hung about Oxford when Whately arrived there. In the previous year Immanuel Kant had died at Königsberg, but Kant and his philosophy meant little to Oxford. To a queer little Worcester College man, Thomas de Quincy, Kant's name, if not his works, may have been familiar, but to most Oxford men of the time literary Germany was *terra incognita*. Educated Englishmen were acquainted with the literature of France, but the ordinary range of philosophic thinking in the British universities of that time is perhaps indicated by the list of authors with which Whately was all his life most familiar. He read and re-read Aristotle, Thucydides, Bacon, Bishop Butler, Warburton and Adam Smith. No doubt he read Hume as well, but the beginning of the century

was a time in which even Hume was unable to scare British theologians. A season of calm weather had followed one of storm and stress. Criticism is good : it exercises the faculties, but it does not nourish them.

This halcyon period has been described by J. A. Froude in his papers on Oxford and the Counter Reformation.

‘Over the pool of uncertainties in which (he says) his generation was floundering, there was a crust of undisturbed conviction on which people could plant their feet and step out like men.’

Froude’s father, Archdeacon of Totnes, was ‘a continually busy, useful man of the world, a learned and cultivated antiquary, and an accomplished artist.’ His sons

‘were excellently educated, and were sent to school and college. Their spiritual lessons did not go beyond the Catechism. They were told that their business in life was to work and to make an honourable position for themselves.’

About doctrine, Evangelical or Catholic, Froude did not think that ‘in his boyhood he had ever heard a single word, in church or out of it.’ The Church ‘had drifted into a condition which he regarded as moral health.’

‘It was orthodox without being theological. . . . Religion . . . meant moral obedience to the will of God. . . . The creeds were reverentially repeated, but the essential thing was practice.’

Whately, who was old enough to have been Froude’s father, and had reached adolescence before J. H. Newman and his followers were born, was so much a product of the eighteenth century that the fervours of the Oxford Movement left him cold. The old-fashioned High Churchmen were Protestants, and Whately, who was never a High Churchman, was uncompromisingly Protestant. Ancestors of his on the spindle side had fought in the Parliamentary armies, and he seems never to have had any sentimental hankering after civil or religious autocracies. With the German Romantics, who had done much to popularize Roman Catholicism on the Continent, Whately was incapable of sympathizing. He never suffered from the spiritual agoraphobia that drives men into the Roman Communion.

He graduated with a double Second Class in 1808, and three years later was elected to an Oriel Fellowship. In the same year Thomas Arnold (Arnold of Rugby in later years) was elected to a Corpus Christi scholarship, and in Waterloo year joined Whately as a Fellow of Oriel. A few years later J. H. Newman joined the same society, and from the first seems to have been attracted by

Whately's personality.¹ The attraction, one feels, was largely the attraction which a masculine mind has for a feminine mind. (The charm of Newman's writing is feminine rather than masculine; 'Lead, kindly Light' might have been written by a woman.) Newman was strongly attracted, but he discovered that the course of Whately's mind was one which his own would be unable to pursue for long. Newman's mind, it has been said, was, like Pascal's, fundamentally sceptical; it was timidly sceptical. Newman did not stray far from the Church Fathers, and the cloister was his spiritual home. It is hard to read his *Apologia* with patience, unless one's feet are already on the path to Rome. One can sympathize with Mark Pattison's sense of relief when Newmanism had run its course at Oxford, and the University was again free to attend to its proper business. Whately does not appear to have read the *Apologia*; if he had, he would surely have been unable to do justice to the writer. The Newman mentality, whether it found satisfaction in Romanism or, as in Francis Newman's case, outside Christianity altogether, was utterly foreign to Whately.

'It is curious to observe' (he wrote to Mrs. Arnold) 'how the brothers Newman, starting east and west, have gone so far that they have nearly met. Both have come to the conclusion that there is nothing of what is commonly called evidence for Christianity; the one resting his belief (if he has any) of that and of the silliest monkish legends alike, on the Church; and the other on the infallible oracle within him.'

With Arnold, who was as Protestant as himself, Whately was in fundamental agreement, despite the fact that their ways of looking at the world belonged to different centuries. It is significant that there are no references to Thomas Carlyle in the *Life* of Whately, though there are several in Arnold's. Whately was only eight years older than Arnold and Carlyle (both born in 1795), but Whately carried much more of the eighteenth century into the nineteenth than either of his juniors. Carlyle and Arnold looked before and after; Whately, like some typical eighteenth-century thinker, was mainly concerned with principles,² and for the

¹ 'And now as to Dr. Whately. I owe him a great deal. He was a man of generous and warm heart. He was particularly loyal to his friends, . . . "all his geese were swans." While I was still awkward and timid in 1822, he took me by the hand, and acted towards me the part of a gentle and encouraging instructor. He, emphatically, opened my mind, and taught me to think and to use my reason. . . . I became very intimate with him in 1825, when I was his Vice-Principal at Alban Hall.' (Newman: *Apologia*, ch. i.)

² His concern with principles was probably a main cause of his indifference to art. His sense of beauty seems to have been slight. Picture galleries bored him. He loved ballad poetry and Scott, and there were passages in Crabbe which affected him deeply. But he had no love for Wordsworth or for meditative poets generally.

discovery of these, examination of his environment was sufficient. In Arnold's opinion,

'the State, being the only power sovereign over human life, had for its legitimate object the happiness of its people—their highest happiness, not physical only, but intellectual and moral; . . . Warburton, the Utilitarians, and, he feared, Whately, maintained, on the contrary, that the State's only object was "the conservation of body and goods."'

He referred to the Utilitarians as men of 'coarse and hard stamp, whose influence could be nothing but evil.'

'In church matters they had got Whately, and a signal blessing it was that they had him and listened to him; a man so good and so great that no folly or wickedness of the most vile factions would move him from his own purposes, or provoke him in disgust to forsake the defence of the Temple.'

From 1831 to the end of his life Whately's defence of the Temple was carried on in Ireland, where his advocacy of national education proved that he was concerned with much more than the conservation of body and goods. It was, in fact, his concern for the spiritual side of life that brought his official connection with Irish national education to an end. He had begun that connection with favourable prospects. The Roman Catholic bishops must have known that the English clergyman who was made Archbishop of Dublin in 1831 had been a supporter of Sir Robert Peel's policy of Catholic Emancipation, in circumstances in which such support was exceedingly unpopular. 'To exclude *any* class of men from public office in consequence of their religion,' Whately regarded as 'making Christ's kingdom a kingdom of this world'; and 'the tempting of persons whose ambition might be stronger than their scruples, to profess a religion they believed false, in order to ensure their worldly advancement,' was, in his opinion, 'holding out a premium to hypocrisy and false profession.' He would have no half measures. To grant the franchise but to refuse seats in Parliament was 'simply to irritate the minds of the class excluded, without really crippling their power of action.' He would have no Helots or Gibeonites in his country.

At the time of his appointment to the archbishopric he was Principal of Alban Hall, Oxford, and Professor of Political Economy. He liked his position and he loved teaching. He seems to have had no Irish connections, and he knew as little as most Englishmen about Ireland (which was practically much farther from England in 1831 than it is to-day). He was not attracted by pomp and circumstance; he was a gentleman, and had a gentleman's social position. According to his wife, it was his sense of duty that prevailed over his desire to stay in Oxford. Whately's sense of duty was no doubt as strong as it is in most

high-minded men, but in making decisions such as his, men of strong personality are much less influenced by the sense of duty than by the challenge which is implicit in the offer of preferment. Whately was in his forty-fifth year, still young enough to be adventurous, and strong enough to hope for success. He accepted the challenge.

The Church of Ireland in 1831 was still in a privileged position, and remained so till its disestablishment in 1869, half a dozen years after Whately's death. Its clergy as a class were socially superior to the priests of the Roman Church, and natural snobs had little to hinder them from acting after their kind. The Roman Catholic churches were always 'chapels,' even for those who used them, but in general one is probably right in describing the relations of the religious minority to the majority as being as nearly Christian as the relations of Churchmen to Nonconformists in Whately's country. There may not be historical evidence for the story of the congregation lent by the parish priest to the Protestant parson who wished to make a good show when his bishop visited the parish, but the story would hardly have been invented unless the transaction had been at least possible. Whately worked amicably for several years on the Board of National Education with Dr. Murray, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Dublin, who went so far as to accept for use in his schools a little book by Whately on Christian evidences. Murray, according to Whately's account, had submitted the book to the Pope before sanctioning its use. But Dr. Cullen, who succeeded Murray in 1852, refused to accept the book, and his refusal was soon followed by its rejection by the Board of Education. Whately was not prepared for such uncritical compliance with episcopal authority; he regarded the act as a fraud on the public, and, being unable to remedy matters, gave up his position on the Board.

With the people of his own Church it cannot be said that he was ever popular. Most of 'the English in Ireland' belonged to families that had been in the country long enough to react to circumstances in a somewhat different manner from that of newcomers from Britain. Whately was a good-hearted man; he and his family lived as simply as it was possible for people in their position to live; the love of money was not a root of evil in the household. During his own lifetime Whately was willing that the archiepiscopal revenues should be reduced, provided that the sums saved benefited the Church. For more than thirty years he gave £100 annually towards the maintenance of a Chair of Political Economy founded by him in Dublin University, and during the dreadful famine years of 1847-49 he is said to have spent £8,000

in the relief of distress. If kindness and devotion to duty deserve recognition, Whately deserved it. He was indeed admired and honoured by a few, and these the most notable of Irish Churchmen; almost the only Irish Churchmen of his time who are still remembered. Through these men, rather than through the Archbishop's books, the Whatelian doctrines — the Broad Church conception of Bible and Church — gradually permeated the dioceses, and provided the more flexible minds with an alternative to rigid Plans of Salvation. But liberalism is always caviare to the general.³

Whately forced himself to act as if 'he cared nothing for the sweet or the bitter,' and it is probable that his brusqueness of manner was directly due to the efforts which he made to 'harden' himself. His critics never suspected that the masterful archbishop dreaded censure above most things. The *skandalon* which, he said, he had to guard against was not avarice or ambition, but the fear of misunderstanding and censure. 'Approbation he had a natural liking for,' but a liking

'so immensely short of his dislike of its opposite, that he would not have purchased . . . a pound of honey at the cost of chewing one drachm of aloes.'

He was greatly worried when his friend Blanco White, who had become a Unitarian, announced his intention of writing his memoirs. White had spent some years as a tutor and friend in the Archbishop's household, and Whately seemed to think that, behind the change in the tutor's religious opinions, readers of the memoirs might suspect a lapse from orthodoxy on the part of the employer. Whately was suspected of Sabellianism, and a man who ascribed a merely temporal and local validity to the Fourth Commandment was undoubtedly a man to be watched. To us there is something comic in the Archbishop's anxiety. We live at a time in which the hard lines of theology have been so blurred that it is often hard to determine whether a thinker is on the orthodox or heterodox side of a line of division; but a hundred years ago the lines of division were unmistakable, and in those days interest in theology was almost as general among the laity as among the clergy. Up to Newman's final departure from Oxford, and perhaps even later, theology seems to have been the dominant interest of the authorities, and the orthodoxy of a candidate for a university appointment was as carefully examined as his scholastic qualifications for the post.

³ The 'general' had little sympathy with Whately in his desire that the Roman Catholic clergy should be paid by the State. Had they been so paid, it is at least probable that there would have been no Church Disestablishment in 1869.

It was probably to Blanco White that Whately was indebted for what he regarded as intimate knowledge of the working of the system of slavery in the West Indies. Whately was wholeheartedly in favour of its abolition, but in the interests of the slaves he favoured gradual emancipation. In dealing with the treatment of criminals he differed from very many of his brethren, in basing his recommendations on the Gospel rather than on the Law; if he had lived in our century, he would almost certainly have sided with Archbishop William Temple in opposing capital punishment. He denounced the transportation of convicts, a practice which the country abandoned in 1868, only five years after Whately's death. His mind, unlike Macaulay's, closed late; beyond middle age he was still willing to learn. He was impressed by the claims of the homoeopaths, when homoeopathy had few influential friends, and he had the courage (or the temerity) to consult homoeopaths when his health failed. But the paralysis which maimed him a short time before his death would probably have defeated allopaths and homoeopaths alike. Long before Science deigned to consider the occult, he examined the claims made for mesmerism, clairvoyance, etc.

Of his numerous writings none has lived. His *Logic* and *Rhetoric*, written primarily for students, held their own for many a year, the *Logic* being highly thought of, and not least by professional logicians; but his anti-Tractarian writings and his little books on Christian evidence and on economics were perhaps necessarily short-lived. Even his once-famous *jeu d'esprit*, *Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Bonaparte*, is no longer read. After Whately's death a book of selections from his writings was compiled; it contains many good things, but, unless my memory has deceived me, it is too solemn a compilation to represent fairly the mind of a man who was both witty and wise.

MORAL ESCHATOLOGY AND THE ATONEMENT

By the REV. RODERIC DUNKERLEY, B.D., Ph.D.

THERE are three possible answers to the question — Was the death of Jesus necessary?

In the first place, there is the view that there was a divine necessity for it to happen as it did. This has, of course, been explained in a great variety of ways — the Cross was the punishment by God of human sin — it was the ransom that had to be paid to the devil for the rescue of man — it was the necessary vindication of the holiness and justice of God. All these views agree that the issue was a foregone conclusion; Jesus came for this very purpose — to die: the Cross was foreseen and foretold long before it happened. There has been much difference of opinion as to His own knowledge of the necessity; some have held that He was aware of it throughout, the shadow falling on Him in earliest years; others, that because He emptied Himself (*Phil.* ii, 7) the truth was at first hidden from Him, so that He shared the political or eschatological hopes of His time until at Caesarea Philippi the future was unveiled to Him.

In the second place, there is what we may call the humanist view — that the necessity was psychological. He being what He was and men what they were, it was certain that a clash would occur. To teach as He did the supreme worth of love and sincerity and humility and service, of inward purity not outward cleanliness, of heart devotion not ornate ceremonial — all this naturally irritated those who were satisfied with worldly levels of thought and conduct. And to contend for these truths so urgently that they — religious leaders though they were — felt openly condemned, this inevitably forced a climax and He had to be destroyed. Long before, Plato had said that something of that sort would happen under such circumstances.¹

The third view is that of moral eschatology, and it does not seem to have received adequate attention. It is that the future was not fixed and certain, neither divinely foreordained nor psychologically inevitable. The issue was open and real choices had to be made. In this view, Jesus came from God to establish the

¹ *The Republic*, II, 362. It is remarkable that the word 'crucified' actually occurs.

Kingdom not only in the hearts but in the lives of men — and so in the life of the nation and eventually of the world. The Jews of His time could have and should have made the moral response necessary for such a glorious consummation; some of them did so, many more might have done so; the general refusal was not divinely destined or necessarily involved. It meant the frustration of God's better purposes and the indefinite postponement of the Kingdom. The Cross was a crime — the blackest crime in history — cosmic crime.

I propose in this paper (1) to outline the reasons for holding this view in preference to the others; (2) to indicate the conception of the Atonement to which this leads; and (3) to answer certain objections.

I

(1) There is, to begin with, the considerable amount of evidence in the Gospels that Jesus cherished high hopes of widespread success in His own lifetime, and that He felt acute disappointment when these hopes were frustrated. I have assembled and discussed this evidence in several previous articles² and will here simply enumerate the four principal points:

- (a) His hope of an abundant harvest then and there (*Mt.* ix, 37; *Lk.* x, 1; *Jn.* iv, 35; *Mk.* iv, 8, etc.).
- (b) His condemnation of the cities of Galilee because they repented not (*Mt.* xi, 20-24).
- (c) His twofold lament over Jerusalem (*Mt.* xxiii, 37; *Lk.* xix, 41-44), definitely implying 'what might have been.'
- (d) His parabolic manifesto at the climax point of His ministry (*Mk.* xii, 1-12, and parallels).

This means that if the issue was a foregone conclusion for either of the two reasons mentioned Jesus was not aware of the fact. And, apart from anything else, in view of His intellectual vigour — the signs of which are writ large on every page of the Gospels — I find it impossible to think that He could miss a point of such cardinal importance. I believe He knew the situation through and through, had assessed all the factors of the position and the chances involved, and yet believed in the real possibility of success — and was right so to do.

When in addition to this one holds, as I do, that He was uniquely from God and in touch with divine truth, it is surely less credible still that He could be deluded in His hopes and mistaken in His disappointments. The above passages are not a few obscure verses in remote corners of the Gospels; they represent His

² *The Expository Times*, July, 1946; Feb., March, Oct., 1947; May, 1948.

thought at certain great moments of deep emotion. If He did not see into the truth of things at such times, then we cannot trust His insight or His message in any respect. Any theory of *kenosis* which ignores this argument is lacking in realism.

(2) We have next the negative point that no valid argument can be levelled against this view on the grounds that the Cross was foreseen (*a*) by the Old Testament prophets, and (*b*) by Jesus Himself. I have already dealt with both these questions at some length and can only summarize the main thought here.

The principal passages in the Old Testament about the Messiah undoubtedly sound a note of triumph, not of tragedy; no one reading them as a whole for the first time without any Christian presuppositions would anticipate the judicial condemnation and death of the promised King. And the one great passage commonly quoted in the reverse sense (*Is.* lii, 13 - liii, 12) really depicts some unnamed hero-servant's vicarious and victorious death and so declares the glory of such suffering for others; of that truth the Cross of Jesus became in due time the most glorious expression, but that is quite another thing from saying that it was purposed and predicted five hundred years before the event.

As to the idea that Jesus foresaw and foretold His own death it seems clear that it was only after His early hopes had been negated by sinful refusal that He did so. The isolated 'bridegroom' text (*Mk.* ii, 20) cannot bear the weight of the opposite contention; we must not lay too much stress on the exact wording which might easily have been modified from such an original as 'If the bridegroom should be taken away . . .'—and of course the possibility of rejection was no doubt in His mind from the beginning. The general predictions after Caesarea Philippi show clear insight into the way things were shaping but give no indication that they were thus shaping through divine necessity. I believe the 'must' of *Mk.* viii, 31 is the 'needs must' of the 'devil's driving,' and it is impossible to prove the contrary. Moreover, all these passages refer to 'the Son of Man,' and this expression almost certainly has a corporate and not a purely individual significance; He saw clash and catastrophe looming ahead and warned His disciples to be ready.

(3) Finally, I cannot believe that the Cross was planned and purposed by God, because this would mean that there was divine sanction upon an act of murder. If it was necessary it should happen, then those who were responsible were the agents of God for the accomplishment of His will. Such an idea is repugnant to the moral sense and it is time that it was completely discarded.

As Professor C. J. Wright has well said, 'The theology of the future will have to be more ethical. No theology which does not accord with the deepest moral consciousness will endure.'³

We may remember that we have high authority for the use of the word 'murder' in this connection (*Acts* vii, 52). It is strange how easily the death of Jesus has been spoken of as 'a necessity' and 'a sacrifice' without any reference to the historic circumstances out of which it came, as though no guilty men were responsible. In Roman legend a brave knight sacrificed himself by leaping into a yawning chasm and so delivering the city from the wrath of the gods. But that is no parallel to the Cross where Jesus was slain by sinful men.

Stranger still has been the way in which the criminal aspect of the Cross has been recognized and yet it has been regarded as necessary and divinely ordained, the antinomy being left unresolved—a most unsatisfactory and illogical proceeding. For example, a certain bishop some time ago wrote in his diocesan magazine, 'We may believe that the action of the Sanhedrim in condemning our Lord was essential for the well-being of mankind . . .' And a prominent Free Church preacher was even more explicit, 'Is it not perfectly clear to us now,' he is reported to have said, 'that all those men, Judas and the priests and Herod and Pilate and the mob and the soldiers, were being made the instruments of God for the redemption of the world?'

Such statements seem to me to be the result of crude and confused thinking. They remind me of the child's remark to his Sunday school teacher who had spoken of the cruelty of the men who destroyed Jesus, 'But, Miss, we couldn't have gone to heaven if they hadn't!' That was of course a logical inference from certain hymns still unfortunately in common use and one quite natural to a child's mind. But it is difficult not to characterize it as immature and immoral for an adult. And I agree with Harold Brierley that the question is one of deep significance for the future of the Church. 'It is my sincere belief,' he says, 'that the *moral* revolt against traditional views has had more to do with the increasing alienation of our age from doctrinal Christianity than any other factor of belief.'⁴

II

What then of the Atonement?

It is my conviction that this moral eschatological interpretation of the Gospel story, far from detracting from the essential message

³ Quoted in *What the Cross means to me* (James Clarke), p. 19.

⁴ *ibid.*

of redemption or lessening the evangelic appeal of the Cross, its reality yields a more moving as well as a more ethical challenge.

(1) *The word 'Atonement.'* In secular affairs this word is, of course, commonly used in the sense of 'reparation' or 'making amends' or 'giving satisfaction,' as when a murderer is said to have made atonement for his crime by suffering the death penalty. In this sense it is constantly employed in the Old Testament in connection with the levitical sacrifices which were deemed to expiate the sins of the people and to make forgiveness possible. And when the death of Jesus came to be regarded in Christian theology as the Great Reparation made by Him to God on behalf of and instead of sinful man, it was natural that this word should be taken over in this sense and used to describe this transaction.

But it was an unfortunate choice of word by the English translators of the Old Testament. For originally it had no such legalistic meaning. It is, of course, properly 'at-one-ment' — the making 'at one' of those who have been separated by enmity or war — in other words, 'reconciliation' or 'peace-making.' And the Hebrew word so rendered (*kipper*) suggests not reconciliation but reparation; so too the Greek rendering in the LXX (*ἱλαστήριον* and allied forms). By its use in this way, then, the word 'Atonement' has been given a significance quite foreign to its proper meaning.

Moreover, there is no justification in the New Testament for its use in this 'reparation' sense. It occurs once only in the A.V. (*Rom. v, 11*), where it translates quite a different Greek word which does not occur at all in the LXX (*καταλλαγή*). And the whole sense of that passage shows that 'reconciliation' not 'reparation' is the correct meaning, so that the R.V. has rightly rendered it so. In view of the original significance of 'atonement,' this would have been a correct and beautiful rendering in this and other 'reconciliation' passages if the misuse of the word in the Old Testament had not taken place, but in view of it the Revisers were clearly wise to avoid it.

It may be said, of course, that though there is thus no justification in the English New Testament for the use of 'Atonement' in the sense of reparation, yet there might have been if the translators had been more consistent. For as they had used it in the Old Testament where the LXX had *ἱλαστήριον* so they might well have used it in the few places where that word or its derivatives occur in the New Testament. I wonder if their avoidance of it was deliberate, because they felt its Old Testament associations were not appropriate to Christian thought? Certainly the emphasis both in *Rom. iii, 25* and *I Jn. iv, 10* on the love and

initiative of God rules out any idea of appeasing Him or making satisfactory reparation to Him. Anyhow, they chose instead a new word, 'propitiation,' which had not been used at all in the Old Testament; it means literally 'making propitious or favourable,' and though theology has gradually filled this word also with 'reparation' ideas — as though God was to be propitiated and His anger turned away — these are not native to it and they are contradicted by the stress on the gracious initiative of God.

In view of all this, there is certainly no justification for continuing to use 'Atonement' in the sense of 'reparation.' And remembering that its original significance was 'reconciliation,' and that this is a central thought in the New Testament regarding the work of Christ, it seems very desirable that we should endeavour to redeem this beautiful old English word and with it to rebuild the doctrine of the Atonement in modern terms.

(2) *The Work of Reconciliation.* 'God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself,' Paul tells us (*II Cor.* v, 19), and in the great passage already referred to (*Rom.* v, 1-11) he is clearly interpreting the death of Jesus in terms of reconciliation. This does not mean, however, that we must confine our thought of His reconciling work to that death; that was the culminating point in the great endeavour upon which He was engaged throughout His ministry, God in Him bringing peace and at-one-ness where there had been enmity and strife.

By His preaching and teaching, by His deeds of mercy and His message of forgiveness, by His challenges and rebukes, by His winsome character and gracious friendliness, He reconciled men to God, reconciled them to the thought of God and made Him real to them, made them at one with Him who before had been His enemies (*Rom.* v, 10). It happened in the case of the sinful woman to whom He said, 'Go in peace' (*Lk.* vii, 50), and in the case of Zacchaeus, 'This day is salvation come to this house' (*Lk.* xix, 9). This latter story is of special significance, for it is the only place in the Gospels where we find the word 'salvation' on the lips of Jesus. And the absence from both these stories and from the Gospels generally of any hint of the idea of *prolepsis* — that blessings were to be received in virtue of an event to take place subsequently — must be remarked, while the emphatic '*This day*' here makes the point still more definite.

This 'peace-making' He offered to all (*Mt.* xi, 28), but though some accepted, most refused, and the great sorrow of this failure is evident throughout the Gospels. 'Ye will not come to me that ye might have life' (*Jn.* v, 40; cp. *Mk.* viii, 12; ix, 19; *Mt.* xi, 20,

etc.). When this happened, there was only one possible thing for Him — being what He was — to do, and of course He did it. He 'endured such contradiction of sinners against himself' (*Heb.* xii, 3), and died at their hands with pardon in His heart and forgiveness on His lips (*Lk.* xxiii, 34). His death was therefore the supreme manifestation of the atoning love of God; as God was in Him reconciling Zacchaeus and all who were willing, so He has been at work ever since in the same spirit, striving with the children of men for their peace, and inevitably the Cross has been the eternal symbol of that Love that 'will not let us go.' As it has been 'placarded' before men's eyes (*Gal.* iii, 1 — Moffatt), the same thing has happened as in the dining-hall at Jericho long ago, the grip of sin has been loosened, the grace of God has conquered, and salvation has come to men's hearts and homes. 'We also joy in God through our Lord Jesus Christ by whom we have now received the atonement' (*Rom.* v, 11).

III

I hope I have already made it quite clear that no valid objection can be raised to this interpretation of Christian truth on the grounds that it depicts a merely human Jesus, a deluded Galilean prophet, or what you will. It is no part of my task in this paper to amass or discuss the evidence and the arguments to the contrary. I do not, indeed, believe that any precise understanding of His person is possible; I agree with Gregory of Nyssa's advice to dogmatists that before they are so positive about the nature of God they should ask themselves how much they know of the nature of the ant; and with Von Hügel's fine word, 'I can't really know a daisy — why then should I expect to know the Being of God?' But Jesus is to me the Word of God, the express image of His character and will — I believe God was in Him uniquely and perfectly revealing His purpose and conveying His grace. There is nothing here of a humanist view of Jesus.

Nor, on the other hand, can I admit that the psychological objection is sound — that Plato was right and that such an one as Jesus in such a world as this was certain to be killed — that in thinking otherwise He misjudged the situation and misread the signs of the times. This is, of course, an impossible view for those to whom He is the Word made flesh. But apart from that it is surely quite reasonable to believe that the right moment had arrived in history for a new step to be taken 'towards the stars'; there have been other such crises in the march of humanity, though not of such supreme importance. I have already advanced reasons for believing that the advent of Jesus took place 'when

the fulness of the time came,' and that the scene was set for mankind's acceptance of a divinely planned era of blessedness.

The fundamental objection to the view here presented is that it denies the foreknowledge of God. If God is omniscient, it may be argued, He must have known what would result, and if Jesus was indeed God's Word He must have had insight into the Divine Mind and shared this Divine foresight regarding coming events including the Cross. Now, I cannot of course stage anything like a full philosophical discussion here of the issues involved, but I must express my profound conviction that this argument is not sound. My view has been well expressed by A. T. Cadoux in a chapter entitled 'The Limitations of God' in his *Essays in Christian Thinking*, from which I quote the following sentences :

'Thinkers have often shrunk from thinking of God as limited, but wherever this reluctance has been brought into contact with experience the result discredits it even in the greatest thinkers. . . . It has surely been a lack of faith in the good faith of God that has withheld Christian thought from exploring the region upon which this door opens. And it leads far; for when once we see limits set to the power of God we see limits to His prevision also. . . . Just in so far as we have moral freedom God cannot be thought of as foreknowing our acts and destiny. He may of course know the alternatives before us and their consequences, but if there ever are real moral alternatives before us (and unless there are we are not morally responsible), then not even God knows which we shall take.'

Yes, the good faith of God is at stake in this plea that the moral eschatological interpretation of the Cross gives us the noblest doctrine of the Atonement.

THE ELECTION OF THE HOUSE OF LAITY

By T. J. WOOD, M.A.

NEXT year (1950) will see the election of a new House of Laity of the National Assembly of the Church of England. The House of Bishops consists of all the Diocesan Bishops of the Provinces of Canterbury and York. The House of Clergy is identical with the Lower Houses of Convocation of the two Provinces, and is elected by the clergy. This House is dissolved and re-elected every time Parliament is dissolved. But the House of Laity is elected every five years, regardless of the dates of Parliamentary elections, and 1950 is the date of the next election. This is therefore the appropriate time for considering whether the existing method of election is the most suitable for securing an adequately representative House of Laity.

The present method is pyramidal. The Annual Parochial Church Meeting in each parish elects, in addition to the Parochial Church Council, a certain number of lay representatives on the Ruridecanal Conference (who are *ex-officio* members of the Parochial Church Council). The members of the Ruridecanal Conference in turn elect lay representatives of the Deanery to the Diocesan Conference, and the lay members of the Diocesan Conference elect the diocesan representatives to the House of Laity. The number of persons elected in each case is determined by the number of names on the Electoral Rolls in the various areas concerned. It will be seen that by this pyramidal method of election the influence of the individual vote of the laity in any parish is a steadily decreasing quantity. In some dioceses the Parochial Church Council has the right to nominate a representative direct to the Diocesan Conference, thus cutting out one step of the pyramid, so that the Parochial Church Council can directly influence the election of diocesan members of the House of Laity, but only through one representative. The form of the election of the House of Laity is by the single transferable vote.

The defects of this method of election are obvious. With each step the interest of the laity diminishes rapidly, and the responsibility of the elected representatives to the ultimate electorate in the parish vanishes. The Rules for the Representation of the Laity give power to a Diocesan Conference to divide the diocese into areas for the election to the House of Laity, and where that

is done the electors would be the members of the Diocesan Conference elected from that area, but the writer is not aware of any diocese which adopted this Rule. But this Rule does indicate a very simple method by which the election might be made much more democratic.

No criticism is implied as to the suitability of the existing or previous members of the House of Laity. The Dean of Lichfield, in his biography of William Temple, laments (p. 281) that in the struggle between the legalists and the moralists in the Church Assembly it was the legalists who won :

‘The voice of the Assembly is now the voice of the administrator, not of the prophet; and so long as its constitution and time-table remain unrevised (so that, for instance, few of the laity outside the more or less leisured classes can spare the time to attend the sessions) its present tone and temper will persist.’ (F. A. Iremonger, *William Temple*, p. 281.)

It still remains true that the House of Laity consists largely of the leisured classes and that the method of its election removes it far from contact with those keen laymen in every parish who form the backbone of our Parochial Church Councils. If the Church is to aim at becoming the Church of the masses every effort should be made to create and maintain a direct and living connection between the Church electorate at its widest and the House of Laity.

A suggestion has been put forward that, although members of the House of Laity are elected by the whole lay membership of the Diocesan Conference, yet each should be allotted a certain area in the diocese and asked to undertake the duty of keeping the parishes (or Rural Deaneries) of that area in touch with the doings of the Church Assembly. This might overcome one objection to the present system, the ignorance of the laity of the doings of the Assembly, but it would not give the laity a sense of their responsibility for the actions of the Assembly or of any power to influence its decisions. The member may invite the audience to express their opinions, but they would not have the means of seeing that the member adequately represented their views in the Assembly. That could only be done if the member were elected by the audience and could be called to account for his stewardship, under pain of losing his seat at the next election. Under the Parliamentary system the member feels a sense of responsibility to his whole constituency; not merely to those who voted for him, but even to those who voted against him. *Vice versa*, the elector feels that he has the right to convey his views to his member and so constantly to bring his influence to bear even upon the day-to-day conduct of affairs in the House. This personal touch is entirely lacking in the House of Laity, with the consequent indifference of the laity to its doings.

It is possible, too, that the members of the House of Laity

lack the sense of their authority in the debates and affairs of the Assembly. Bishops and clergy are apt to suggest that they know more of the Church's work and needs than the laity; they are also usually more ready speakers, and more accustomed (thanks to the pulpit) to air their opinions without giving the layman a chance of expressing his. A glance through any *Report of Proceedings* will show the large proportion of the time occupied by clerical speakers, and the comparatively small number of the laity who address the Assembly. More frequent separate meetings of the House of Laity might give greater opportunity for the expression of their views.

The submissiveness of the House of Laity is balanced by the arrogance of the clergy. Boniface VIII claimed absolute power over the Church, but at least he did not claim to *be* the Church. But in the proposed new Canon 126 it is asserted that

'The Sacred Synods of England . . . are the true Church of England.' and by 'Sacred Synods' are meant the Houses of Convocation, clergy and bishops, of Canterbury and York. The laity apparently do not count in the Church: they are only there to foot the bills. The House of Laity has no lot or part in the government of the Church of England! The laity will, through the kindness of the clergy, be allowed to see the proposed Canons in due course, and, no doubt, they will be able to give advice, but they will be quite unable to approve, disapprove, or amend them. This is enough to give any assembly an inferiority complex, and it is doubtful if the laity of the Church will regard as authoritative any Canons promulgated without their concurrence.

It is emphatically essential now, therefore, that the House of Laity should be properly representative of the rank and file of the Church. How is this to be brought about?

(1) *The Electorate.*

The widest possible electorate would, of course, be the Electoral Rolls of every parish, but the difficulties and expense of an election on that basis rule it out. Election by Parochial Church Councillors would be simpler, but the number of Church Councillors in each parish would have to be laid down on a basis proportional to the Electoral Roll (which is not the case at present). It is possible to give the Parochial Church Council one vote, which is the practical result when parishes elect direct to the Diocesan Conference.

But the most convenient electorate seems to be the members of the Ruridecanal Conferences. These are chosen by the Annual Parochial Church Meetings, which ensures a broad basis. They

are also *ex-officio* members of the Parochial Church Councils, and so would respond to the suggestions of the Parochial Church Councils, though they could not (and should not) be compelled to vote as the Parochial Church Council directs. Their number is proportionate to the size of the Electoral Roll, and so each parish counts in voting power according to the number of professed Church people on its roll.

The size of Rural Deaneries varies considerably throughout the country, but it would be a simple matter for a Diocesan Conference to divide the diocese up into areas, as was contemplated in the original constitution. Such areas need not coincide with existing Rural Deaneries, or any selection of them, though naturally grouping of parishes by Rural Deaneries would seem the easiest and most appropriate method of the division of the diocese.

(2) *The Method of Election.*

The choice is between the existing method ('proportional representation by the method of the single transferable vote') and the method of electing one representative for each area. The first method would perpetuate some of the weaknesses which have already been pointed out. The Parliamentary system has proved the most efficient in developing interest and responsibility, and it would be worth while trying its effect upon the life of the local church and the character of the House of Laity.

We therefore suggest (a) that for the 1950 election Diocesan Conferences should take advantage of their power under Rule 22 (2) to divide their dioceses into suitable electoral areas, so that each area returns its own member to the House of Laity; the electors for this election would be the members of the Diocesan Conference; (b) that Rule 20 (1) be amended so that in future elections for 'the lay representatives for the time being in the Diocesan Conference' should be substituted 'the lay representatives in the Rural Deanery Conferences of the electoral area.'

We believe that this method would greatly stimulate the interest of Church people in the affairs of the Church Assembly, and increase the power and prestige of the House of Laity.

MODERN EVANGELISM

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HE who writes on evangelism may fairly be asked for his credentials. To anyone who asks for mine I can only give the reply of the washerwoman when asked for a 'character': 'There you 'ave me.' This article is being written because it insists on being written. Evangelism is in the air, and during a holiday my mind from time to time has been milling over the past twenty years of earning my living among the Gentiles, thinking of the different kinds of responses that I got and failed to get, and watched others getting and failing to get, in reply to different presentations of Christianity in talk, writing and broadcasting.

The first generalization that this milling process yields is that evangelism is an extraordinarily difficult subject about which to make sound generalisations. Everything is unpredictable. Why should a sub-editor, a comparative stranger, open his heart to me one night at supper, while years of intimate conversation with an intimate friend, outstanding in duty and kindness, did apparently nothing to restore his evaporated faith and churchmanship? And when a person does accept, hungrily sometimes, what one has to give, it usually has upon him an effect quite different from the effect one has expected and planned. The experience communicated becomes something quite strange in him, and one must make the effort to let the inspiration take him along his own way unhindered.

Of recent years I have tried to direct the attention of broadcasters to evangelism, and by watching their varied efforts it is possible to get glimpses and reminders of certain qualities that belong to all good modern evangelism, whether it be broadcasting, preaching, conversation, journalism or the use of an art-form such as drama, fiction, debate or film. This article is a talk among friends interested in the same thing, so let me for brevity put down my observations in the form of points.

1. Evangelism is not merely saying more loudly in a new place what one is used to saying about religion. It is starting up a real dialogue with a mind strange to the experience one is trying to convey—a mind directed and stored and conditioned differently. Evangelism is effective in so far as it makes a 'person to person' call. It is not merely persuading another person of the

truth of a theory or an historical statement. A live spark of recognition or realisation, a flash of experience, has to pass between two people who are in real communication with one another. What is meant by 'real communication' is something so simple that it is beyond speech, but it is wonderfully suggested by Buber in his little book *I and Thou*. In all your human relations, the other person is to you either an 'it' or a 'thou.' The same person may be an 'it' to you at one moment, a 'thou' at another. As an 'it,' he or she is an impersonal instrument estimated in reference to your purposes — a driver of buses, a bringer of meals, a proposer of laws. But it sometimes happens that you look on another and he or she becomes real to you as a person, and real communication passes between your two selves. It is along this current that true evangelism passes. In his book *Between Man and Man* Buber emphasizes that it is along these real 'I—Thou' relationships that God speaks from one person to another. The value of a 'special' missionary is that he or she makes the non-Christian easier for the Christian to talk to intimately.

In old-fashioned evangelism, masses of the faithful were gathered to be heated and fused together by an evangelist, and the heat so generated melted the resistance of the 'unsaved' who was brought into this living crucible. I cannot think that there is much to be done along these lines to-day. The faithful can still be gathered and 'fused,' but the present-day resistances of the 'unsaved' are seldom of the kind to be melted in this way.

2. If, then, evangelism is to be God's word spoken through and along real human relationships, we must as evangelists give these relations two qualities. We must love the other person as he is in order to bring him 'alive' to us and establish contact. 'We love, because He first loved us.' This capacity for undeserved, pre-reciprocated loving is surely the characteristic Christian 'secret weapon.' That word 'love' is so difficult to make sound sense to the person outside the Christian experience.

In Laswell's quite secular *Analysis of Political Behaviour* he analyses this kind of relationship into four elements — respect, understanding, sympathy and helpfulness. He puts tremendous emphasis on respect — deference, as he sometimes calls it — as a universal human hunger for which many are starved. I think we might be as willing to learn from Laswell in this matter as he is from us, and not only for politics but for evangelism also we should keep in sight these four elements that he detects in working love, being mindful to divest ourselves of 'superiority,' and make real to ourselves those persons that we are trying to reach by regarding them, as they now are, with respect, understanding,

sympathy and helpfulness rather than as a spiritually stupid multitude, or a mass embodiment of tendencies hostile to the Christian gospel, or as potential converts to our own opinions — 'scalps,' as it were.

3. If we are to use this real person-to-person medium it follows that our conversation must be honest. Only honesty can be communicated thus. I do not suggest that anyone eager to spread the gospel would be willingly dishonest. But I think most of us need to peel off some layers of thought, opinion, prejudice, habit and emotion that are sub-honest before we can transmit those convictions and experiences through which we can, as it were, look God in the eyes. Our pride, or sense of security maybe, is bound up with our going on believing and repeating some article of faith that we have always professed. Hence the effort, conscious or unconscious, to repress doubt-raising considerations and suppress evidences that would transfer that article of faith to the list of 'things that are shaken.' Hence the hysterical emphasis on the doubtful and questionable not infrequent among evangelists. The bullying note, the misuse of the 'either—or' formula in support of this or that dogmatic statement, which is so tragically common among Christian evangelists. These are characteristic attempts to shout ourselves into confidence in order to carry conviction.

So many people to-day think we are not intellectually honest. I don't think that it is necessary for an evangelist to convey the impression that he has a tidy, systematic, comprehensive, confident faith that has all the answers to life's problems. As things are to-day, I would rather go to the other extreme, and state my belief that most 'unbelievers' can be moved and stirred only by a transmitted 'agony' or striving. One insight of faith maintained amid storms and troubles may be more convincing and companionable than a system. Of course there are people who want to feel that there is an infallible Authority capable of giving the final answer to every question, and for such complete submission to a system is the only possible form of conversion. As an example of the other kind, I remember Archbishop Le Fanu, not a stirring preacher as a rule, profoundly moving a student congregation by his personal candour. There is a danger that the present back-swing to orthodoxy may produce a temper too hard, cocksure, unsympathetic and disrespectful to other people's doubts and personal insights.

4. Evangelism must be distinguished from *teaching*, which is the effort to build up a system of information and ideas in a

mind more or less co-operating, and from *edification*, which is the strengthening and developing of certain convictions and attitudes in those who want them strengthened. Evangelism is *awakening*. I think modern evangelism must always work through a two-way conversation, even when it takes 'mass' form as in preaching, and even where conditions do not allow the person reached to reply aloud, as in broadcasting. The sentence that starts out of the printed page as God's answer to the personal crisis, the broadcast talk that finds its way to the listener's very need for help—these are typical forms of modern evangelism. The listener must feel that his point of view is being considered.

5. No one is in the first instance converted by general considerations, or by general ideas. It is the truth newly recognized in the light of some personal crisis—grief, frustration, joy, opportunity, conflict, task or ideal—that carries conviction. I don't think the crisis need be conscious always. The impact of religion may show a person for the first time what is going on inside himself.

6. The words of a religious message may start into life as they strike into some vital need or experience of the listener. That situation may give the message its 'setting-in-life,' and the beginning of its career within the personality. But this very relevance raises one of the dangers of evangelism. I remember Principal Selbie of Mansfield College, Oxford, once interrupting himself abruptly in the middle of a lecture on the psychology of religion at Oxford. He leaned impressively across the rostrum: 'Gentlemen,' he said, 'remember this. Your people don't want truth. They want comfort.' Every pastor knows how terribly true this can be of many of his flock. Their religion is an emotional stay and comfort, sometimes a form of ego-centric spiritual self-indulgence, rather than a living sacrifice, a dedication to God, service to objective Truth requiring painful enlargements and alterations in the self. It must be the work of those who follow up the evangelist to see that the newly received message does not remain merely to function within some personal sickness or deficiency of the hearer, but that it does broaden out into a spiritual sanity, that is, a wide objective appreciation of God's will for man within which the believer must play his part.

7. Another danger to the mental balance of the convert can be seen sometimes in people who come to Christianity out of an exaggerated scepticism, especially the kind of scepticism that has been rooted in a materialist philosophy of science. On conversion, these people are apt to rush headlong in the opposite

direction. The '*credo quia impossibile*' mood takes charge, and the more impossibilities they can find to swallow, along with the vital simplicities of Christianity, the better they like it. But faith which is internally confident enough to become calm contains a certain amount of critical activity. Spiritual health is a balance between emotional and intellectual activities. The great von Hügel says that spiritual sanity consists in the interplay of three elements, each of which is found uppermost in one of the three groupings of Anglicanism. There must be (i) the individualistic, emotional, personal and direct experience predominant in the Evangelical or Protestant type; there must be (ii) the historico-institutional experience of community, continuity and churchmanship predominant in the Anglo-Catholic type; and there must be (iii) the critical and rational activity predominant in the Modernist or Broad Church school. Every healthy spiritual life must contain all three elements, but in every spiritual life one or other will come uppermost. So the religion into which we try to introduce our converts should have breadth, variety and massiveness. Conversion should be the beginning of a religious education.

8. That leads on to the need for making our evangelism oecumenical in spirit, and linking it to this movement that is now shaking Christendom. We shall not get very far if we consciously direct our efforts to enlisting more Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists. There will be health, breadth and magnanimity in a message directed in the first instance to arousing men to the presence of God, the service of one another, and to brotherhood in the Kingdom of God within which each community is growing in wisdom and charity by virtue of its increasing fellowship with others. This note of magnanimity, of openness of heart and mind, is desperately necessary in modern evangelism. The saving of one's own spiritual skin from the pains of hell cannot be given any reality, and though most converts will settle down in the community of the converter, evangelism as denominational recruiting will have a limited appeal.

9. The dogmatic energy in modern evangelism should, I think, direct itself first to building up the idea of God in our listeners' minds. Here are found the supreme difficulties for those whom we would convert. This is not the place to discuss those difficulties, but I am sure that the evangelical task of modern theology, realizing that anthropomorphism has been overdone by our forefathers, is to build up a wider, richer, more varied conception of God. For this many picture-languages will be needed, drawn from the great theologies and philosophies. It will not be

possible to unite these picture-languages logically into one system, but they will convey genuine insights into what is going on in God's activities towards His creatures. We cannot, of course, present all this richness and variety of experience in our first approach to those whom we would convert, but we can impress them with the fact that it is a whole world of beauty and meaning into which we are persuading them to enter, and not any one frantic formula which we are offering as a panacea. God is the whole environment of spiritual Reality waiting to speak to us with the voice of Christ in every circumstance of our lives. But I do not think that our listeners will make much of Jesus until they see Him against the background of the Father to whom He would lead. To begin with the notion of Jesus-worship blots out the reality of Jesus within a cluster of abstract absolutes. I am sure that in evangelism it is a mistake to belittle the teachings of Jesus in order to exalt Christology. Jesus Himself did not belittle them. And we must be firm in insisting on His oneness with men as well as His oneness with God.

10. In all deep seriousness I believe that an evangelical theology must give God credit for a sense of humour. The arbitrary, the capricious, the single hot formula, the legal, the vindictive, the irrational and unreasonable, the infantile can best be purged from our presentation of Christianity by this simple principle more powerful than much philosophical argument. If, as we must in order to understand Him, we give God credit for human attributes in responding to human behaviour, then a sense of the absurd, a loving laughter dissolving what is ridiculous in our thoughts of Him, must surely be one of those attributes.

The very fact that it is laymen whom we are trying to convert should save our theology from extravagances. For laymen must take their Christianity in the form of that which can be lived, and living requires proportion. The fruits of the spirit are the intelligent and efficient kinds of love.

11. It follows from this that the language of evangelism should sound relevant, and make sense in the minds of our hearers. Religious baby-talk is a recreation that can only be safely indulged in by the mature. The casting down of golden crowns is well enough for those of us who have been brought up to it, but it does not appeal to the young man from the garage, nor to the young woman from the teachers' training college. The language of religion, so far as is possible, must be the words used by intelligent 'plain' people when discussing matters of importance to them.

12. The Christian call must be to the saving and the improving of this world as a way of fellowship with God. What other call could come from God our Creator and Father, who has revealed to His creatures His love for them, and taught them how to love one another? How can you love the world without striving to improve it in those ways in which your talents qualify you for improving it? How can we love our fellow-men unless we use our day to bring them a nobler, wiser, better to-morrow? And must not we try to bring them all the good things that a loving Father, who works through our wills, would will them to have — better bathrooms as well as better visions of God? It is of course true that we must guard against the exaggerations and falsehoods of Utopianism, just as we must guard against that complacent despair into which modern 'continental' theology can so easily lapse. 'The troubles of our hot and angry dust' will be with us human beings till the end of our history. These troubles, and the very struggle for a variety of ideals to realise themselves all at once in our limited lives, must always prevent this from being a tidy or a restful world.

We can tell those who listen to us that, in giving their service here and now to the Kingdom of God on earth, they shall not be disillusioned so long as they realize that they are plunging into a turmoil, and when they have fought their good fight they will leave a tumult behind them. We are called to generosity of heart, reverence for life, worship of God. If we can so live as to give more vitality to ideas and causes that bring more abundant life to our brethren — more reverence, understanding, sympathy and help — then in some measure we are meeting God in Christ, and entering into our Eternity now.

THE PARABLE OF THE UNJUST STEWARD AND ITS BEARING ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE EARLY CHURCH

By GUY KENDALL, M.A., author of *The Social Application of Christianity*

NONE of the parables of the New Testament presents so many problems as that of the Unjust Steward. Regarded as a parable of Jesus it is almost unintelligible. But as a document of the social life of the early Church it is illuminating.

It is clear, in the first place, that either the evangelist himself, or some redactor, was puzzled by the phrase 'make friends for yourselves in the world of dishonest profiteers' because he has placed at the end of the parable a miscellaneous collection of sayings, which have nothing in common except that they bear on the right use of wealth, either condemning dishonesty in the matter of a trust, or giving warning generally against the temptations of wealth. But it is plain that the parable as it stands did not hold up the conduct of the steward as an awful warning against dishonesty or covetousness. He is in some way or other a model to be followed and imitated. Indeed the prevalent fashion is to treat the parable as an analogy; 'as the steward made the best of his own sordid opportunities, so should you make the best of your spiritual endowments.' This might be convincing were it not that it does violence to the original Greek, which says distinctly 'make friends *out of* the unjust gain,' and no legitimate interpretation can possibly make that equivalent (even in Hellenistic Greek) to '*after the manner of* the unjust gain.'

It may be that there was an original parable of the Master Himself which used as an illustration a defaulting steward. It has indeed been suggested that it was derived from an incident which actually happened — in the case, perhaps, of Chuza, that steward of Herod Antipas, whose wife Luke numbers among those who assisted Jesus and His followers with material ministrations. The parable follows those of the Lost Sheep, the Lost Coin, and the Prodigal Son, all of them illustrating in some way the saving of the lost, and it may be that the steward was originally such a type. But speculation on the original form (if any) of the parable is of far less interest than the interpretation of it in its present form.

Fortunately a direct clue to the meaning is to be found in a fragment of the work of 'an elder' quoted by *Irenaeus*.¹ He is described as one who had been a hearer of those who had seen the Apostles, and therefore must have written in the early years of the second century. He actually quotes the injunction, 'Make friends of the unrighteous profit,' in support of his theme that property unjustly acquired in the heathen world, with all its doubtful commercial practices, may legitimately be kept by Christians and used in support of their cause. Even slaves who have been guilty of theft of their masters' property need not restore it. Their owners have exacted labour from them by force; it is only the due of the slaves to have a share in the wealth they have helped to create. If the Israelites were justified, in the hour of escape, in 'spoiling the Egyptians,' and indeed had a divine command to do so, surely the Christian may do the same to his Roman masters. He mentions specifically those Christians who are employed in the Imperial Court, and minister, as far as they are able, to the needs of their poorer Christian brethren. He concludes: 'So we build up for ourselves the tabernacle of God. For with doers of good God dwells; as the Lord says, "Make to yourselves friends of the Mammon of unrighteousness" . . . For whatever we had acquired when we were heathens, by unrighteousness, now that we have become believers we turn to the Lord's service, and so are justified.'

There can be no doubt that a feud between rich and poor arose in the Christian Church during its quite early years. There were those who endeavoured to make Christianity a purely 'proletarian movement,' and others who thought that there should be no such limitation—neither of rich nor poor, of slave nor free. Such a feud is clearly in existence among those to whom the *Epistle of James* is written, the author's sympathy being with the poor. It may be reflected, too, in the contrast in *Acts*² between Joseph Barnabas, who sold his landed property and gave the proceeds to the common fund, and Ananias and his wife, who retained part of their property and represented it as being the whole. The attitude of Luke himself is something of a puzzle. It is well known that the cause of the poor is stressed in his Gospel. He alone gives the Magnificat, with its triumph of the poor over their rich oppressors. He presents the Beatitudes in their proletarian form: 'Blessed are you poor because yours is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are you who hunger now, for you shall be filled'; and, conversely, 'Woe to you rich because you have your comfort in full. Woe to

¹ *Haer.* iv. See 'fragments of the elders preserved in Irenaeus' in Lightfoot's *Apostolic Fathers*.

² iv, 36—v, 11.

you who are full now because you shall hunger.' This is exactly reflected in the parable of Dives and Lazarus, which significantly follows that of the Unjust Steward almost immediately. In fact, it comes so closely in its wake, and without any introduction or context, that it is tempting to see in it a 'proletarian' rejoinder to the Unjust Steward. There is no suggestion that Lazarus had been oppressed or illtreated by Dives. In fact it has been shrewdly remarked that the beggar would not have made the house of Dives one of his beats if it had not been a fairly profitable pitch. It is just reversal of fortune. Indeed, it is an obvious illustration of Prof. Arnold Toynbee's contention that there was a fund of traditional proletarian stories which were passed on, possibly in pictorial form, among the illiterate stratum of the Roman world. For Dives and Lazarus are found in very similar form elsewhere, *e.g.* in Egypt. We need not follow Professor Toynbee into his not wholly convincing theory of the pattern of the proletarian martyr-hero, of which he believes the Passion of Jesus to be an example. But that there was such a schism between the original poor of the movement and the later contingent of the wealthy — perhaps exemplified by such aristocratic converts as Flavius Clemens and Domitilla, actually of imperial blood — we may well believe. The Unjust Steward may then be a plea for the more liberal conception which Paul certainly adopted. Did it not make for the good of the community, as well as being required by Christian love, that rich as well as poor should be set on the road to 'the everlasting habitations'?

BRAINS TRUST

Question: 'May not *Isaiah* xlv, 7 explain the origin of evil?'

'I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace (*or* well-being) and create evil (*or* calamity); I am the LORD, that doeth all these things.'

Answer (1).

In the verses immediately preceding this one, we have the affirmation that it is through the agency of Cyrus¹ that the world will realise that 'there is none beside' Jahveh: 'I am the LORD, and there is none else' (v. 6). The LORD is therefore responsible for light and darkness, for well-being (the word is much more comprehensive than 'peace') and for calamity (the word has not the primary moral significance which 'evil' might suggest). Whether or not the writer had Zoroastrianism in mind, it is clear that he is here rejecting any fundamental dualism — whether between light and darkness, or good and evil — and asserting the supremacy of Jahveh over fortune and disaster alike. Both are in His creative power and control.

Might this explain the origin of evil? Three points are important. (a) In taking good and evil to originate together in God's purposes, the suggestion

¹ The King of Anshan, the great and 'liberal' conqueror from Persia.

would certainly avoid the difficulty besetting all dualism, *viz.*, how could we ever be sure that God's ultimate triumph was possible? (b) But at the same time the suggestion would raise other difficulties of its own. Even though the verse does not ascribe *moral* evil to God, can the position suggested really avoid this conclusion? Or can any denial of dualism likewise avoid it? If we avoid a 'devil,' have we really a good God? If we are sure of the triumph of God's purpose, is that purpose good? So far as I see, the only way to deal with this difficulty is to claim that God's purpose, while embracing good and evil, effects an end 'beyond good and evil.' We may usefully read F. H. Bradley in this connection to see both the advantages and difficulties of such a standpoint.² (c) It would be dangerous and false to conclude from the parallelism with light and darkness that evil might somehow be negative and so have its origin in mere privation. This is certainly no part of what is asserted by the verse. Nor need it be associated with Bradley. It avoids the difficulties of (a) and (b), but only at the cost of compromising human suffering and making the Atonement a pseudo-Redemption.

But it is important to notice that the verse itself is concerned *not* with moral evil but primarily with the practical and positive calamities that can beset men and nations.

IAN RAMSEY.

Answer (2).

This verse from 'Second Isaiah' reads: 'I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace, and create evil; I am the LORD, that doeth all these things.' By 'evil' is meant not moral evil (sin) but physical evil (calamity).

If light upon the problem of physical evil is sought from these words it must be remembered that the Hebrews, having no interest in physical science, with its regular sequences, regarded every event as directly willed by God. This suited the Old Testament prophet, but it creates moral difficulties for the believer in the God revealed by Jesus. We cannot agree that each single item of suffering is 'sent' to fulfil some particular providential purpose. Though suffering is sometimes a punishing or warning or purifying agent we cannot explain all suffering thus. 'Evils are the necessary by-products of nature's uniformity, and *that* is a precondition of rational and moral life.' If we are to 'sow an act, and reap a habit; sow a habit, and reap a character' — i.e. to become rational and moral creatures — the world cannot be a place in which *anything* may happen; and the regularity of nature brings pain as well as pleasure: *e.g.* if *water* is to possess all its beneficent qualities it must at the same time possess its capacity to drown us. (See Tennant, *Philosophical Theology*.) Evils are by-products of the vast providential design of the God whose almightiness and ethical character Second Isaiah perceived so clearly.

C. G. CHALLENGER.

Answer (3).

'I, the Lord, create evil.' It is a provoking statement. The traditionalist view is that man by his own act in Adam fell from the pure state of the dawn of existence and brought evil into human nature. This condition of shame needed to be put right by the Crucifixion. There is, however, another Christian view of the origin of evil which seems to me to be related to Isaiah's assertion. It is the view urged by the famous mediaeval thinker Abelard. He claims that man does not have an original guilt from the Fall, but that there exist certain disturbing tendencies in his created nature. If he consents to these they become the occasion of evil. The tendencies are not evil in themselves. Man's consent to give them free play causes evil. Neutral in themselves, these factors are thus the means by which man may form his character. They are 'the material of a struggle.' The Christian faith and the divine love

² *Appearance and Reality*, Ch. xxv, and *Ethical Studies*, 'Concluding Remarks.'

displayed on Calvary show the good life to be aimed at within these disturbing conditions of nature. It seems to me that Abelard's view falls into line with what Isaiah says. There is a certain rational purpose in this situation that man faces which suggests a rational creative origin of it for the benefit of man's life on earth. The threads of our nature are tangled, but they can be woven into a garment of holiness. Hence, a sovereign creator may well have shuffled the cards which he puts into our hands, while at the same time giving us in religious experience and revelation the system for playing with success the game of life. Evil is so powerful that many prefer to think that God cannot cause it, or even to suppose with some Eastern faiths that both God and a Power of Evil have independent existence. I would none the less point out that in this 45th chapter of *Isaiah* we listen to some of the deepest and most authoritative notes in the orchestra of religion; and verse 22, 'Look unto me and be ye saved, etc.' effected the spiritual conversion of Spurgeon, the prince of nineteenth-century preachers.

J. R. MCCALLUM.

Answer (4).

Yes; I think this verse does suggest where we are to look for an answer to the Problem of Evil. If evil had its origin in a power outside God which is at last to be destroyed, why was it not destroyed at first? And even if it is ultimately to be redeemed, may not another such power come into being? In fact once such a dualism is admitted it is very hard to see it as anything but a part of the eternal order of things, and the war between good and evil therefore as an eternal stalemate.

If on the other hand we say that evil came into being by God's intention, we do not mean that God is partly malevolent, but that of necessity evil exists in order that good may result from its being overcome, and that ultimately evil is therefore unreal. The standing objection to this view is, of course, that there appears to be so much more evil than is appropriate to the fulfilment of such a purpose. But how are we to tell what the right amount should be? Obviously it must be more than can easily be resisted; and since contingency is an important part of it, there can in any case be no assessment of how much evil is suited to our condition.

But whilst it is right to wrestle with this problem, we have to remember how speculative any solution of it must be. Whatever its origin, our Christian business is the same—to 'overcome evil with good.'

D. L. SCOTT.

Answer (5).

In answer to this question, it may be said in the first place that to ask for a complete 'explanation' of the origin of evil is to ask for something that is beyond human power either to give or to understand. Evil (like free-will) is something we have to accept as a fact, if we would make any sense out of life; but it stubbornly refuses to be fitted in to any system of human logic. Dr. L. P. Jacks once said (substantially): 'The *only* thing we really know about evil is that it is something to be fought. Discussion as to *how* or *why* it came into existence never leads us anywhere.'

Now with regard to the text, 'I make peace, and create evil.' The English translation is liable to suggest a more philosophic idea than was really in the mind of the writer. Moffatt renders the sentence thus: 'I bring bliss and calamity'; and Professor Wardle, in Peake's Commentary, endorses this rendering. Now if this is accepted it implies that the prophet is not thinking here of the origin of evil in general, but of the alternations of weal and woe which constantly come upon mankind in general, and which have been the special lot of the Chosen People. A concordance will show that the Hebrew word used here often denotes 'calamity' as well as moral evil.

In that case, the primary meaning of the text is that peace and war, prosperity and adversity, joy and sorrow are all in some measure under the control of Jehovah, the All-sovereign God. This is surely a profound (and essentially Christian) conception, which receives its sublimest illustration in the Cross, where we see evil, in its most stark and brutal form, transformed into the supreme means of salvation for men.

In this sense the text does throw light on the significance of evil and the possibility of its redemption by Divine Love. But to take the text as teaching that God is the direct author of evil (as the god Krishna claims to be, in the *Bhagavadgita*) may indeed satisfy our desire for logical or philosophical completeness, but only at the expense of injuring our ideal of God as perfectly Good. And for religion, goodness is even more essential than completeness.

E. C. DEWICK.

I venture to add a brief historical footnote.

I heard Bishop Boyd-Carpenter preach a sermon on the 'plumb-line' (*Amos* vii, 7). The preacher pointed out that it was the same force 'Gravity' which kept a wall stable and also caused a wall to fall: the result in each case depended upon the relation of the wall to the force. If perpendicular, gravity kept it upright: if out of the perpendicular, gravity brought it down. Amos, like all the prophets of Israel, until the Persian period, was a monist, as is the author of *Isaiah* xlv, 7. Satan only came into Israel's religion in the Persian period. (cf. *II Samuel* xxiv, 1; *I Chron.* xxi, 1.)

H. D. A. MAJOR.

Editorial comment.

It would certainly appear, as Mr. Dewick says, that 'evil' here means 'calamity' rather than moral evil. God is represented as Providence ordaining prosperity and adversity as He will. The context makes this clear: it is the LORD who has raised up Cyrus to fulfil His purpose (see verse 13). People must not dispute or criticize what the Lord sees fit to ordain: 'Woe to him that striveth with his Maker. . . . Shall the clay say to him that fashioneth it, what makest thou?'

For myself I feel that this is not bad advice which the prophet gives. We seem to trust Providence far too little; and think we know better than He does how to run the world, striving in our headstrong and ignorant way to put things right for Him. Professor Butterfield has said something of this sort in his fine wireless talks. We want to shake down the apples before they are ripe, and to hurry on time by pushing the hand of the clock forward. We only make a mess of things by striving to hurry them on. This is the fault which mars the doctrinaire idealist. Also, as I think Professor McNeile Dixon pointed out, evil, if hastily destroyed in one form, returns in another. We force one enemy to unconditional surrender only to find another more menacing arisen in his place. The Taoists were right; things are often best left alone, *i.e.* to Providence.

With regard to moral evil, New Testament writers seem to attribute this to Satan, the adversary, who is a real person. If this involves dualism, that cannot be helped. Satan is a very real person in the Gospels, and not least in the Fourth, where he is 'the Prince of this world.' That Satan gets the worst of it in the end is indeed proclaimed as certain in *Revelation* and elsewhere. But he has a long run for his money.

J. C. HARDWICK.

BOOK REVIEWS

CHRIST AND OTHER MASTERS¹

The Rev. E. C. Dewick's book, *The Gospel and other Faiths* is not a study in Comparative Religion but a discussion of Christian foreign missionary strategy. Mr. Dewick writes as one who knows its importance for he has spent his life in training men for the Christian Ministry both in England and in India. He is an unflinching, yet discriminating and essentially practical Liberal Christian. This characterises his treatment of missionary problems and methods. He recognises that there are three attitudes which the Christian Church can adopt towards other religions. He summarises them as Conflict, Fulfilment, Co-operation. The first attitude has been that of the Christian Church from the First Century down to the Eighteenth. Dr. Glover's arresting volume *The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire* presents us with brilliant pictures of this attitude in church policy in its earlier stages. The second attitude which regards the Christian Religion, not as the adversary, but as the fulfilment and perfecting of religious truth, inadequately possessed in varying degrees by the other religions of mankind, has been held by Christians wherever the *Logos* Christology has dominated Christian thought.

It has to be confessed, however, that this *Logos* Christology has had its influence more among the Church's theologians than among the Church's missionaries. To-day in church circles the *Logos* Christology is at a discount and so the conviction that the Christian religion is not the adversary but the fulfilment of all that is essentially true in the other religions is being rejected. This attitude in its most extreme form characterises the widely influential teaching of Karl Barth which in its missionary aspect has been proclaimed by Dr. Kraemer in his book *The Christian Message in a non-Christian World* (1938).

Mr. Dewick writes of it thus:

'The resultant theology, which Dr. Kraemer entitles 'Biblical Realism', is based on the following dogmas:

(1) That God is so 'entirely other than' man and all created things, that no essential or 'organic' union is possible between God and Man or the rest of Creation (*Continuity*, p. 5).

(2) That the Revelation of God in Jesus Christ is also 'entirely other than' any divine operations that may be traced in Nature, History or the religious experience of mankind; for God (we are told) has revealed Himself to man only in Jesus Christ and in the Bible, and there alone can we find any real 'Word of God' to man, or any real 'Act of God' on the plane of human history (*The Christian Message*, pp. 61, 107).

(3) That the Revelation of God in Jesus Christ is absolute and final, so that the Gospel must never be regarded as only relatively true (*The Christian Message*, pp. 118, 156).

The third attitude to the non-Christian faiths adopts as its keynote 'Co-operation'. This attitude is of course impossible for the Barthian, but it is essential for the Liberal. It is only those who take a dynamic, not a static, view of the essential character of the Christian Religion: those who regard

¹ *The Gospel and Other Faiths*, by E. C. Dewick, B.D. (Canterbury Press, 6/-; 1948.)

the Christian Religion as expressing pre-eminently, not the precepts but the principles of Jesus: those who hold with St. Paul that the Religion of Christ is a Religion, 'not of the letter, but of the Spirit: that the Christian Religion is essentially evolutionary, developing, expanding, as it is faced with new situations, new problems: new crises: it is only Christian missionaries so minded, who are able to recognise and obey the call to co-operation with the other great religions of mankind.

The practical difficulties of such co-operation are great. Nevertheless the Christian missionary ought ever to be on the outlook for opportunities of co-operation. In dealing with this co-operative attitude it is not the present perfection or the achieved finality of the Christian Religion which ought to be stressed. It is its capacity to *achieve* perfection providing that in all its manifold experience it is loyal to the principles of the Gospel of the Kingdom as revealed in the personality, message and mission of Jesus.

Moreover, this Christian co-operative ideal of religious finality ought to be united to the ideal of a world-wide religious comprehensiveness, which whilst it emphasises the uniqueness of the Christian Religion does it in no exclusive sense. This Christian comprehensiveness in its attitude towards the other great religions of mankind cannot be better expressed than in the words of the writer of the *Epistle to the Hebrews*:

'God having provided some better thing for us, that apart from us they should not be made perfect.' (*Hebs.* xi, 40).

Mr. Dewick discusses with fearless insight the problem of the relation of *Evangelism* to *Proselytism*.

'Should the proclamation of the Gospel always and of necessity include a call to the would-be disciple of Christ to come out from his non-Christian religion and join the organised Christian Church? To that question, the majority of missionaries have in the past unhesitatingly answered, Yes. A few, however, have maintained that the missionary's primary duty is to '*evangelise*' (that is, simply to proclaim the Gospel of Christ), and not necessarily to '*proselytise*' (that is, to urge all converts to leave their ancestral faith), but to leave this decision to their conscience. Of late, however, there has been an increasing tendency to emphasise the absolute necessity and Divine authority of the visible Church, and consequently the universal obligation of all Christians to come and join it—in other words that is, to become 'proselytes', in the original sense of the term.' (p. 127).

Mr. Dewick holds that in the majority of cases this decision is sound. He writes:

'For very often the non-Christian religions insist on practices that are inconsistent with Christian principles, or forbid the liberty that a Christian has a right to claim.'

He cites instances of this in Orthodox Hinduism and in Buddhism and Islam. In such cases the Christian convert must forsake his ancestral religion and become a member of the Christian Church but when that Christian Church is divided into hostile sects and is corrupted by superstition and low moral practice what is to be done in facing this choice of evils?

In reply Mr. Dewick writes:

'This seriously weakens the force of the demand that in all cases the convert must "join the Church"; and consequently, although we believe that in the majority of cases this appeal may be justified on practical grounds, we cannot regard it, in the present state of Christendom, as a Divine command of universal and absolute obligation.' (p. 129).

This decision seems to us to be justified by the saying of Jesus:

'Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye compass sea and land to make one proselyte, and when he is made, ye make him two-fold more the child of hell than yourselves.' (*Mt. xxiii: 15*).

From this it may be inferred that Jesus held that there were cases in which a man would do far better morally and spiritually by remaining in his pagan community than by becoming a Jewish Pharisee.

H.D.A.M.

THE SURVIVAL OF ANCIENT GODS*

This book, *La Survivance des dieux Antiques*, is worthy of the high tradition set by the publications of the Warburg Institute on various aspects of European culture and its merit has been recognised in France by the award of the prix Fould of the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres (Institut de France). The work was printed in France at the beginning of the war, which fact accounts for the delay in its publication in this country.

In the sub-title (*Essai sur le rôle de la tradition mythologique dans l'Humanisme et dans l'Art de la Renaissance*) M. Seznec states more fully the theme of his work; but even this description does not do justice to the amazing range of cultural data surveyed, for the book is a veritable history of Western religious thought and literary and artistic activity from the end of the Ancient World down to the seventeenth century.

Agreement seems to be growing among scholars that the Middle Ages were far less a sombre and static period of human culture and the Renaissance was not so brilliant and sudden a phenomenon as was before commonly supposed. In consequence thereof several recent German and American writers have set themselves the task of tracing the reasons for the survival of certain elements of the cultural tradition of the Ancient World throughout the mediaeval period and the modes in which such survival was effected. M. Seznec makes his contribution in this field of study by pursuing a new line of research, namely, *à démontrer que les dieux ont survécu, au Moyen-Age, dans des systèmes d'idées, déjà constitués à la fin du monde païen*.

As effective belief in the gods declined in the Graeco-Roman world, various explanations were advanced of the ancient deities, whose place in social life was not correspondingly lessened with the diminution of their hold over men's religious feelings. These explanations may fairly be grouped under three headings. M. Seznec considers first the part played by the Euhemerist theory, which held that the myths were supernaturalised interpretations of historical facts and the gods were deified men. This line of apologetic adopted by the intelligentsia of pagan society was in time eagerly seized upon by the Christian Fathers and fashioned into a potent weapon with which to attack paganism. But, as M. Seznec shows at length, this Christian exploitation of Euhemerism had a curious repercussion in that it operated, not only to save the old gods from oblivion in the Middle Ages, but also to endow them with a unique reputation, which gave them a new lease of life, howbeit in a very different rôle.

Their new and unexpected career is traced out through its many and bizarre forms. *Quos pagani deos asserunt, homines olim fuisse produntur*. Accordingly Adon de Vienne (a continuator of Isodore of Seville) is found putting forth in his *Chronique des six Ages du Monde* a scheme of history which has two parts, the sacred and the profane; and in the latter the gods appear as ancient heroes. Similarly in Brunetto Latini's *Le Livre du Trésor*

* *La Survivance des dieux Antiques* by Jean Seznec. The Warburg Institute, London, 1940, pp. 371+47 plates. Price 30s.

Mercury is listed with Moses, Solon, Lycurgus, and Numa Pompilius as a benefactor of mankind, while Jacques de Bergame (*circa* 1483) honoured the gods as the initiators of civilisation, e.g. Minerva first taught the art of working wool. The gods too did useful service in providing a creditable ancestor to many a noble family or a distinguished founder to an aspiring town.

Another line of pagan apologetic had been that of explaining the old gods as cosmic symbols and their myths as dramatisations of natural phenomena. Although Paul was alive to the dangers of such astral beliefs, other New Testament writers reveal the extent to which they were influenced by them (e.g. the Story of the Magi, the eclipse of the sun at the Crucifixion, the promise of the Morning Star to the faithful in the Apocalypse). The later Fathers admit the influence of the stars on human life, Augustine for example holding that the *daemones*, as *aeria animalia*, for the present inhabited the celestial bodies in order to work their fell purposes. This tacit acceptance of the tenets of astralism was abiding, and in mediaeval Christianity, through the immense attraction of astrology, it became a powerful factor in the preservation of the memory of the ancient gods. Some Christians appear to have been conscious of the fact that a measure of pagan belief was thus being fostered and an attempt was made by certain *astrothéosophes* to transform Cepheus into Adam, Cassiopeia into Eve, and Perseus into the Logos, while the Priscillians replaced the sign of the Zodiac by the twelve Patriarchs. But such attempts to Christianise astrology met with no real success and evidence is abundant of the way in which the reputation of the gods as potent beings was furthered by this pseudo-science, e.g. it was duly noted that the birth of Mahomet and the Black Death coincided with the conjunction of the planets Saturn, Mars and Jupiter. The memory of the classical deities, however, was perpetuated in some strange forms, owing to the fact that much ancient astrological lore was mediated to Christian Europe by the Arabs. In the celebrated astrological treatise composed by Michel Scot in Sicily about 1243-50 the figures symbolising the stars and planets bear little obvious relationship to the classical prototypes and they seem to be drawn from orientalised exemplars; Jupiter is represented as an ecclesiastic or a judge, while Saturn becomes a warrior and Mercury a bishop. The research carried out by the late M. Saxe on the representation of the planets in Islamic manuscripts fortunately elucidates the origin of these curious figures, and it appears that the Arabian conceptions of the genii of the planets derived from Babylonian originals. Incidentally it is interesting to note that on the campanile of S. Maria del Fiore in Florence Andrea Pisano depicted Jupiter as a seated monk, holding a cross and chalice.

The Church did at times seem to wake to the dangers implicit in astrology and certain precautionary measures were taken. However, the cult was too firmly established in the highest ecclesiastical circles for such action to be effective, and when it is learned that Pope Leo X founded a chair of astrology, while Julius II employed astrologers to calculate the day of his coronation and Paul III the hour of each consistory, it is evident that the Church, howbeit unwittingly, was thus instrumental in preserving respect for the potency of deities whose rule she had once struggled so hard and suffered so much to overthrow.

The third way which M. Seznec discerns in which the memory of the ancient gods was preserved throughout the Middle Ages and down to the Renaissance was that of allegorical interpretation. The method had already been formulated in pagan times, and in due course it proved a convenient instrument to Christians who had retained the ancient poets for the purpose of education but were conscious of the essential paganism of their subjects and themes. In the sixth century the *Mythologiae* of Fulgentius showed what

could be effected by this use of allegory; for example the union of the Swan with Leda was interpreted as symbolising the union of Power with Injustice, which brought forth the cause of scandal and discord (Helen). The practice clearly won increasing popularity, despite a few isolated attempts such as that of Gregory of Tours to expose its danger of perpetuating pagan ideas. Accordingly, in process of time there was evolved a veritable *Philosophia moralis* (which was indeed the title of a work attributed to Hildebert de Lavardin, an eleventh century bishop of Tours). Of especial interest in connection therewith is the popularity enjoyed by Ovid. In a delightful passage M. Seznec tells of a collection of extracts from the *Metamorphoses* which were allegorically interpreted for the edification of nuns: '*ce qu'il y a de piquant, c'est que le déesses sont interprétées comme étant les nonnes elles-mêmes! Les dieux sont le clergé; leurs mariages sont les réunions des moines et des nonnes.*' Deserving of particular notice too is a long poem entitled *Ovide Moralisé* (early XIV cent.), which is variously attributed to Philippe de Vitry, bishop of Meaux, and Christian Legonais de Sainte-More. In this work, which was evidently very well known, Diana is identified with the Trinity, Acteon with Jesus Christ, Phaeon with Lucifer, while in Ceres seeking for her daughter was found a symbol of the Church saving sinners. The denunciation of paganism by the Council of Trent seems to have served but to encourage the use of allegory, for the study of the classics was still retained in education and classical subjects continued to be required by the patrons of art. Consequently, although appearing truly quaint to modern eyes, it is not surprising to find that in a Catholic tract addressed to Protestants in 1607 '*pour figurer l'Eglise romaine invitant les protestants à rentrer dans son sein, on évoque la Nymphé Salmcis appelant Hermaphrodite!*' while the Society of Jesus chose to represent itself under the figure of Mercury, descending to earth to perform the commands of God.

An interesting fact which is clearly evident in the illustrations which M. Seznec reproduces from various mediaeval and Renaissance documents is that, though the memory of the gods of Greece and Rome thus survived, their classical forms almost entirely disappeared and instead they were endowed with fantastic bodies and dress. Moreover, loath to neglect anything seemingly relevant which was found in ancient writings, those who compiled the various manuals of mythology, from which the artists drew their information, included many of the bizarre Egyptian and oriental deities which had infiltrated into the religious complex of Graeco-Roman society. But perhaps even more remarkable in this connection is the fact that scholars and artists never seem to have sought to any effective extent for information about the gods from surviving monuments or coins and intaglios. And the one exception which M. Seznec notes enhances the remarkable nature of the fact; for the effect of a copy made by Cyriacus of Ancona of a fifth century Greek bas-relief of Hermes on subsequent representations of Mercury was profound. Consequently the question naturally raises itself as to why at least the example of this appeal to the original form did not forthwith set a fashion for similar research into the relics of ancient culture.

M. Seznec concludes his study with the comment that the Renaissance certainly did not constitute a break with the past so far as interest in the gods was concerned; rather '*Pour ceux-là, pour ces survivants, la Renaissance ne fut qu'une fontaine de Jouvence; ils y retremperèrent leurs membres perclus et déformés.*'

In this history of the vicissitudes of fortune experienced by the gods of Greece and Rome as they passed through the Middle Ages on to the Renaissance no reference is made to the clandestine ways in which they may have been still worshipped in odd corners of Europe. As Miss Margaret Murray

sought to show some years ago, there is reason for believing that in the gods worshipped by the mediaeval witches there survived some memory of an ancient horned deity. That some memory of the gods of the Graeco-Roman world also survived in local superstitious practices is a reasonable inference which may be supported by a certain amount of data. However, it is understandable that M. Seznec did not concern himself with such an underworld of obscure beliefs, for he has an almost too rich abundance of material with which to deal as he seeks to trace the fortunes of these ancient deities in the literature and art of the mediaeval and Renaissance periods.

M. Seznec's book is generously supplied with illustrations from certain relevant documents and they afford striking visual evidence of the strange and bizarre forms under which the classical gods were then imagined. An exhaustive bibliography is also given of the printed sources.

It may be noted that some typographical confusion has occurred in a few lines of the text at the top of pages 288 and 289.

S. G. F. BRANDON.

Velden-am-Woerthersee, Austria.

SEX: A ROMAN CATHOLIC VIEW*

We are told in the *Life of Young* printed among those of Dr. Johnson that when the author of *Night Thoughts* decided at the mature age of fifty to take Holy Orders, he addressed himself to his friend Pope for the best instructions in theology, and that Pope in youthful frolic advised the diligent perusal of Thomas Aquinas. With this treasure Young retired from interruption to a remote place in the suburbs. His poetical guide to godliness hearing nothing of him for half a year and apprehending he might have carried the jest too far, sought after him and found him just in time to prevent an irretrievable derangement.

Dr. Messenger gives us in his second volume a synopsis of the opinions of the Schoolmen about the married life of Adam and Eve during their too brief honeymoon in the Garden of Eden. It all sounds rather hypothetical, not to say fanciful and remote.

The main body of the work, however, is a practical treatise on married life from the point of view of a modern Roman Catholic priest. Everything published by a Roman priest has what journalists call a semi-official character. 'It will be understood', he says, 'that the writing and publication of a work such as this at the present time is no easy task'. The sort of censorship to which every Roman Catholic priest who wishes to publish anything has to submit has its disadvantages even in the eyes of loyal members of the Church. Dom Illtyd Trethowen, O.S.B., Editor of the *Downside Review* is quoted as saying,

'Theological works may fail to see the light of day because the censor whose *nihil obstat* has been asked considers that their publication would be inexpedient. There may be nothing against faith and morals in them, yet in the present state of theological thought they may cause misunderstanding. This is a vicious circle, because it is impossible for an improvement to take place in the present state of theological thought unless such books are published.' (Vol. I. Preface).

We heartily concur and think it might apply to other subjects besides sex. Restraint and economy are apt to degenerate into downright *suppressio veri*.

* *Two in One Flesh*, by Rev. E. C. Messenger, Ph.D., in Three Volumes (Sands & Co. Ltd.; 22/6).

Dr. Messenger says that it is almost a commonplace of modern literature that the Catholic Church adopts an extremely hostile attitude towards sex in general, and that Catholics are prejudiced against sex life. He declares that the authentic Catholic tradition is quite contrary to this aberration, though he has to admit that the unfavourable view of sex can claim the support of some great Catholic names. It assuredly can, particularly that of the great Latin Doctor St. Jerome, who exhausted all the resources of his rhetoric, all the fierceness of his lion Latin, to exalt virginity and debase matrimony. He admits indeed, that there have been saints among married people, but these have kept their virginal life in their married state. What he would have said of the ordinary love story which appears in a Parish magazine, what exclamations of horror the publications of the Mothers' Union would have drawn from him is too painful to contemplate. Of modern novels those of Mr. Aldous Huxley would probably have struck him as the least objectionable.

Fathers of the Church, in particular Origen, St. Gregory of Nyssa, possibly St. Chrysostom, St. John Damascene, and St. Augustine in his earlier writing held that, if man had not fallen, the human race would have been propagated in some angelical manner. Francois Mauriac, a Catholic novelist, in his *Thérèse*, makes his heroine speak of 'the indelible filth of her married life'. (Vol. I, p. 10).

One is tempted to say, '*Malo cum Hieronymo errare*'. Undoubtedly there was in the attitude of the saints of the fourth and fifth centuries a strong element of exaggeration, a lack of measure, a rebound from the squalid licence into which Paganism lapsed. But they had hold of a profound truth: sex, considered simply as an appetite, belongs to the lower part of man's nature, to that part of us which we have in common with the brutes. There is bound to be a reaction one of these days, and it may take an extreme form. Huxley's *Brave New World* shows the way we are going.

The word 'Sex' in its modern sense is not found in our best writers. The earliest instance we remember is in *Paradise Lost*, Book IX; Milton, very appropriately, put it into the mouth of the Devil who is tempting Eve. 'The sex' was in the civilised eighteenth century a gallant way of referring to the fairer half of humanity. 'O Woman, Woman, what a Sex you are' said Mr. Turveydrop.

The notion that the Middle Ages besmirched the relations of the sexes is a superficial view. Ancient and modern literature differ in nothing so much as in the importance which they attach to the relations of men and women. In ancient literature the love interest is in serious works normally subordinate. There is no heroine in the *Iliad*; the emotional stress lies in the relations of the two friends, Achilles and Patroclus. The story of Dido is an episode in the *Aeneid*, the main theme of which is the foundation of Rome; Aeneas' treachery to the Queen destroys any interest we might possibly feel in his character.

Love, not sex, is crucial to Christians because of the background of chastity. The loves of Abelard and Eloisa are infinitely more poignant than those of, say, Antony and Cleopatra. Beatrice would not have been Dante's guide to Paradise if he had married her; there is not a word in the *Divine Comedy* about her husband—or Dante's wife. Similarly Moslems like Omar Khayyam seem to get a thrill out of drinking wine which is denied to Christian toppers.

With the Renaissance something of the full-blooded life of antiquity entered into the body of Christendom. From Shakespeare to Tennyson and Browning, Love is the master-motif of literature. To-day, alas, we have fallen into the trough of mere sex, and post-Christians have no longer the naïve innocence of the childhood of our race. Othello's occupation is gone, and so is that of William Shakespeare; there is no room for *Romeo and Juliet* or

Measure for Measure; *Much Ado about Nothing* would be the proper title for most sexual modern novels.

One can only hope, and one does so with a considerable degree of confidence from one's knowledge of many charming young people of both sexes, that the mirror which our modern intellectuals are holding up to Nature is a cracked one, and that in fact it is their own reflection which they are seeing in the glass.

It remains to quote the opinion of this modern Roman priest on certain burning questions of the day. He says that Catholics are of opinion that sex instruction should be given by the parents. We are inclined to agree with him. The ludicrously Philistine notion that teaching on the most delicate and difficult of all subjects should be handed out like mugs of free milk by any certificated, or uncertificated, teacher is not worthy of serious discussion. That great good might be done by an exceptionally good or wise teacher who knew how to gain the love and respect of boys and girls is true, but one cannot legislate for exceptions. The average parent would not be well-advised to risk the future happiness of his son or daughter on such a portentous gamble. Sex knowledge will not make a human being chaste any more than a knowledge of book-keeping will keep him honest.

GAMALIEL MILNER.

THE TRUE ISRAEL*

It is remarkable that hitherto no Early Church historian should have addressed himself to a detailed account of the relations between Jew and Christian in the centuries immediately following the epoch which closed with the destruction of Jerusalem. Perhaps too readily has it been supposed that the Church as a whole, like its greatest missionary, turned to the Gentiles.

In the Preface to his important work upon St. Matthew's Gospel, Dr. G. D. Kilpatrick hints at the future publication of a detailed study of the relations between Church and Synagogue during the period A.D. 70-135. And now Professor Marcel Simon of Strassburg offers us, in what may well become a standard work the results of his enquiry into the 'relations between Christians and Jews in the Roman Empire (135-425)'. The book, which is very fully documented and presents an admirable conspectus of the mass of literary and archaeological material available to the student of the period, follows a scheme both logical and comprehensive. Yet we must confess to our misgivings at the author's affirmation in his Preface that 'the strictest objectivity is the law of all historical investigation' (p. 5)—an assertion which, we suspect, would be condemned as meaningless by many modern historians (on this point see Norman Sykes: *Some Current Conceptions of Historiography and their Significance for Christian Apologetic*, J. T. S. Vol. L. pp. 24-37).

Why is the year 135 selected as the point of departure of Prof. Simon's study? Because, we are told, the fall of Jerusalem in 70 marks the beginning rather than the close of an epoch. Only with the collapse of the revolt of Bar Cochba was the last significant explosion of Messianism quelled; only then did the ultimate rupture of Judaism from Greco-Roman culture become plainly apparent. Henceforth Judaism folds in upon itself; the future lies with Rabbinism. Prof. Simon quotes Harnack with approval (p. 51): 'The destruction of the Temple by the Romans really destroyed nothing; it may be viewed as an incident organic to the history of Jewish religion. When pious people held God's ways at that crisis were incomprehensible, they were but deluding themselves' (*Mission and Expansion of Christianity* Eng. tr. Vol. I, p. 11). But perhaps the pious people saw more deeply than Harnack. The overthrow

* *Verus Israel*, by Marcel Simon (Boccard, Paris; 1948).

of Palestinian Judaism, so Prof. Simon explains, brought to an end the feelings of privilege and superiority experienced by the Jew of Palestine *vis à vis* his brother of the *Diaspora*, thus effecting a new solidarity. 'After 70 and 135, just as previously, two tendencies exist side by side in Judaism: the one narrow, intransigent, isolationist; the other broad and tolerant. Only in stages will the triumph of the former come about' (p. 49). Is this not something of an over-simplification? Prof. Simon himself demonstrates most ably the complexity of Pharisaism; he cites Guignebert: 'When we say Pharisee we are not exhausting a definition, for there were doubtless Pharisees and Pharisees' (p. 31). In spite of valuable pages reviewing the relevant evidence, including a most interesting section on the remarkable phenomenon of synagogue art, we remain unconvinced that Jewish liberalism was at any time more than a parasite upon orthodoxy. 'Liberalism in this sense (and, the reviewer would add, in any sense) is an attitude much more than a system' (p. 34). But if this 'attitude' had proved finally victorious, would Judaism exist as a significant force to-day? We are forced back to the theological problem from which we set out.

From the Christian angle the period of Hadrian's War is described as significant because only from the beginning of the 2nd century does the attitude of the Church to the Synagogue become fully evident. From about 135 a specific anti-Jewish literature begins to make its appearance in Christian circles. Yet forty years earlier St. Matthew's Gospel, we would suggest, provides ample evidence of an unambiguous relation between a Christian community (possibly that of Antioch, though in the present connection it is unnecessary to identify the locality) and the Pharisaic authorities. And Marcionitism, far from compelling the formulation of the Church's attitude towards the Old Testament and Judaism, as Prof. Simon urges, represents an exaggeration, none the less perverse for being logical, of a point of view recognisable in the Gospels themselves. Marcion, like many another theologian, died misunderstanding St. Paul.

In the course of a valuable account of the political background of the period it is convincingly shown, we are persuaded, that the Jewish share in the persecution of Christians was relatively insignificant. The conclusion of J. W. Parkes is quoted and accepted: those texts which suggest a general conspiracy against the Christians on the part of an organised Judaism 'proceed from a theological exegesis, and not from a trustworthy recollection of historical facts' (p. 152). 'The Christian use of the Old Testament,' Dr. Parkes continues, 'made of the Jews an historical impossibility' (*Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue*, p. 148).

The second part of the book deals in detail with the conflict between the two orthodoxies, Christian and Jewish. It must suffice to commend the praiseworthy thoroughness with which Prof. Simon has analysed the methods and content of Christian polemical writings. Both contestants appealed to the Scriptures, and the interesting point is made that not only did Jewish suspicion of the Christian use of the Septuagint occasion the production of the rival versions of Theodotion, Symmachus and Aquila, but a limited recognition among Christian scholars of the validity of certain objections levelled against their received text gave an impetus to the critical labours pursued with such distinction by Origen and Jerome (pp. 184-5).

An important chapter 'Christians in the Talmud' opens, inevitably, with a discussion of the vexed problem of the identity of the *Minim*. 'The somewhat indefinite label of *Minim* covers a diversity of meanings, varying at different times and places . . . In many instances we must resign ourselves to uncertainty . . . To the initial question, Were the *Minim* Gnostics or Judeo-Christians? we can reply, They were sometimes Judeo-Christians' (p. 218).

And a little later: 'It is not *a priori* unlikely that the Jews, continuing regard as deserters from Judaism even those Christians who had finally broken away from it, should have applied the term to orthodox Christianity' (p. 21). We may compare Dr. Kilpatrick's interesting reference to the 1st century benediction *Birkath ha-Minim*: ('for the excommunicate let there be no hope . . . may the Christians and the heretics suddenly be laid low and not be inscribed with the righteous'). 'The immediate result of this insertion in the liturgy would be to make it impossible for Jewish Christians to take part in the worship of the synagogue' (*Origins of the Gospel according to St. Matthew*, p. 109). But to Rabbinic maledictions which Prof. Simon is able to relate to Christians corresponds the ugly phenomenon of Christian anti-semitism. The heart of the matter is at once recognised: 'Real Christian anti-semitism is theological' (p. 246). The rôle assigned to 'the Jews' in the Fourth Gospel was not determined by the caprice of an individual Christian thinker; we are in the presence of an interpretation of the part played by the Chosen People in the Divine scheme of Redemption, an interpretation of the greatest significance in Christian thought. It therefore seems permissible to attach less weight to Prof. Simon's assertion that: 'Christian anti-semitism appears in the last resort as the defensive reaction of the orthodox hierarchy against the Jewish danger, the Jewish evil', an evil 'essentially moral and religious' (p. 273). Attention is drawn to the comparable significance of the economic factor in the encouragement of modern anti-semitism. But does not the apparent fact that different causes provoke an identical hatred render necessary a more searching scrutiny of the motives and conditions of the perennial persecution of the Jewish people?

The third and last part of the book covers rather more familiar ground and deals with miscellaneous aspects of the contact between Christianity and Judaism. A chapter on Judeo-Christianity concludes: 'Judeo-Christianity represents only a very sporadic phenomenon, with little depth. Even in Palestine the Ebionites are, compared with the Great Church, a minority, condemned to disappear sooner or later' (p. 313). The principal danger for the Church, we learn, comes from Judaism proper. Nevertheless there is much truth in the contention of Dr. Du Bose that the Ebionite heresy (we are of course aware that Prof. Simon employs the epithet in a more restricted sense) 'is on one side of almost every Christological question that has arisen or can arise' (*Ecumenical Councils*, p. 50).

A useful survey of Jewish proselytism is followed by a consideration of various 'Judaising' tendencies within the Church itself. Here we are on a favourite battle-ground of the liturgiologists, and Prof. Simon scarcely ventures to enter the fray, confining himself to a few pages devoted almost exclusively to the Syrian Church. 'The affinity linking Christian ritual to Jewish represents only one aspect of a more general dependence making of primitive Christianity a product of Judaism . . . A continuous process of liberation was achieved at a varying rate in different environments' (p. 359). Prof. Simon's conclusions will not commend themselves to those who still regard distinctive Christianity as essentially a product of the Greek mind.

A final chapter treats of the curious and well-known fact of the Jewish reputation as magicians and sorcerers in antiquity. 'We must look in the Bible, in the origins of the Mosaic religion, or even further back, in the old pre-Mosaic Semitism, for the roots of that Jewish magic which at the beginning of the Christian era is exercised with such remarkable vitality throughout the Empire' (p. 399).

In a close-packed Conclusion Prof. Simon draws out his estimate, to which the consideration of the various themes of the book has led him, of the causes of the ultimate defeat of Judaism, in spite of its apparently advantageous

position at the outset, by the Christian religion, itself in an important sense the offspring of its vanquished rival. If a personal, and perhaps irrelevant, reflexion may be permitted, we would say that to the dispassionate analysis of available data by the modern historian we prefer the theological approach of the Prophets of Israel, with their powerful awareness, such as we are now mercifully recovering, of the activity of a God of History. Such a book as that of Prof. Simon leaves us with the uneasy conviction that something of supreme importance is lacking. Prof. Butterfield's recent broadcast lectures are relevant to our meaning.

It has been possible only to sketch in outline the scope of this large work, and to offer almost at random comments on points which have seemed to us of interest. It is much to be hoped that such inadequate treatment has not obscured the merits and importance of a work which must certainly receive close attention from serious students of the first centuries of the Christian era.

G. B. F. COOK

T. B. STRONG: DON, BISHOP, MUSICIAN *

* *The Life of T. B. Strong, Bishop, Musician, Dean, Vice-Chancellor*, by Harold Anson, Master of the Temple. (S.P.C.K., 1949; 8/6.)

No student of the *Dictionary of National Biography* can fail to be impressed by the many-sided accomplishments of our English Episcopate, especially in the sphere of education. Canon Harold Anson, Master of the Temple, has contributed a very frank, readable and extraordinarily well-informed addition to our English episcopal biographies by his life of Thomas Banks Strong, Dean of Christ Church, Vice-Chancellor of Oxford, Bishop of Ripon and Bishop of Oxford, whose pupil and intimate friend he was.

Strong was a Londoner, educated at Westminster and Christ Church, Oxford. Chateaubriand, the author of the brilliant Christian Apology *Le Génie du Christianisme* which created a profound impression on Napoleon Bonaparte, was one of Strong's ancestors. Yet there was nothing about Strong in appearance, manner or temperament that was not characteristically English. He was very shy but completely self-collected. He was very observant and had remarkable eyesight—undergraduates used to say he could see a fly on the wall on the further side of Tom Quad. In discussion he was very quick in the uptake and possessed a great quality of retort. Strange to say he was entirely indifferent to athletics: beloved by his pupils, immensely popular with his fellow-dons, he did not enjoy social functions and avoided, whenever possible, the society of women. Although an ecclesiastic, he was bored by ecclesiasticism and ceremonial. He said:

'When I go to the Cowley Fathers' church I retain my usual robes, and they put on what they like: I stick to my seat, and they prance about as they please.'

He wrote to an incumbent about vestments:

'I have no objection, especially if the congregation which comes to that service wishes to have them. It is always a matter of marvel to me that people should either want or dislike vestments, or care whether they are used or not, so I should be very sorry if there was a row over it.' (p. 56.)

'When one of his friends remonstrated with him for making no pause after the Consecration in the Communion Service, he inquired why people wanted a pause, and was told that many people used the pause for reciting prayers from the Roman Missal and other sources. "Oh!" said Strong, "I never use any of those cock-and-bull prayers."'

The Bishop was a learned liturgiologist and took a prominent part in Prayer Book revision. He possessed a profound Christian faith but without a touch of pietism in speech or manner: devotedly loyal to the Church of England, he retained to the end of his life the garb and ecclesiastical way of a Victorian bishop. 'An excellent chairman' and 'a great committeeman,' he regarded the debates in ecclesiastical assemblies as a grievous waste of time. A lady asked the Bishop whether

'he had heard *Much Ado About Nothing* (then being played at Oxford)'
 "Yes," said Strong, "I have just spent a week at the Church Assembly."

During a tedious discussion at a Diocesan Conference the Bishop appeared to be strenuously taking notes of everything said. Someone passing behind his chair observed with some surprise that the Chairman's notes consisted of scores of music.

As Bishop of Ripon and later Bishop of Oxford, he was held in general respect but was not popular. As a preacher he was neither sentimental nor rhetorical nor eloquent. He could hold the attention of an academic congregation but not that of a mixed multitude. Undoubtedly it was in the academic sphere that his gifts were pre-eminent. As Head of his College, without being in the slightest degree a martinet, his administration of discipline, in which insight, moderation and humour combined, was immensely effective. As Censor, and later as Dean of Christ Church, he reformed inherited weaknesses in a discerning, judicious, evolutionary manner.

When the first World War broke out it became his duty, as Vice-Chancellor of the University (to which office he had succeeded in 1913) to co-operate with the War Office in drafting into the national service large numbers of Oxonians. His gifts in the selection of men for commissions secured the admiration of the military authorities. Canon Anson writes: 'The Vice-Chancellorship was, I think, the outstanding success of Strong's life.'

Anglican Liberalism became his debtor when in 1925 he succeeded Bishop Burge as Warden of Ripon Hall, a post he retained till his death. Although its Warden he did not identify himself with its methods and aims, yet on various crucial occasions he showed himself a firm friend of the Hall and its Principal. Canon Anson writes:

'He desired that points of view which were not his own should be generously catered for. . . .'

'He once told me that he considered Dr. Major to be the true successor of the Tractarians, because, like them, he was always trying to discover the true nature of the Primitive Church. When many people objected to Dr. Major's Institution to a very remote country parish in the diocese, on the ground that he did not believe in miracles, the Bishop took pains to take the Institution himself,' and was accompanied by Bishop Shaw, the Archdeacon of Oxford, who performed the Induction.

Of Bishop Strong's own religious position the best word to describe it seems to us to be 'open-minded.' His chief theological work was his Bampton Lectures, *Christian Ethics*, 1896. He was much more a moralist than a metaphysician. His position theologically and ecclesiastically is admirably summarized in an article he contributed to the *Contemporary Review* on the Prayer Book of 1928. He wrote:

'The criticism against the New Prayer Book seems to rest upon an inadequate view of the position of the Church of England and an inadequate ideal of truth. The Church of England has, as we have already noticed, been comprehensive of various limited and abstract points of view. All have arguments in their favour: all can appeal to Scripture:

but none can claim to be exclusively true. There should be an infeasible right in the English Church for those who value most highly the direct and immediate access to our Father in Heaven. There should be a no less infeasible right for those to whom sacramental rites and organized worship and definitely appointed order appeal no less strongly. There should be a no less infeasible right for those who wish to discover by careful testing and criticism the true reason for the faith that is in them. Any one of these which tries to oust the others will be doing the Church of England and Christianity at large incalculable mischief.' (p. 61.)

There are two sides of his personality which for those who knew him stand out pre-eminently: his great gift of humour, particularly of the academic kind. His *bon-mots* were many. When the President of Magdalen asked him whether Christ Church would feel hurt at Edward, Prince of Wales, becoming a member of Magdalen, he replied that he thought the only Oxford College which could feel hurt was Jesus.

Strong's other characteristic was his intense devotion to music. Music was his supreme solace and recreation. He was the only bishop to receive the Hon. D.Mus. of the University of Oxford.

Without pretensions to modesty, he possessed a profound Christian humility from which every form of self-righteousness was absent. Even criminality in his clergy did not sever him from them—he visited them in prison.

As we peruse Strong's life we are surprised that a man so out of the ordinary should have been made a Bishop. He certainly would never have become a Bishop if his appointment had depended upon election by a Diocesan Conference or by a Council of Bishops. Like many other distinguished members of the Episcopate, it was only the method of State appointment which placed the mitre on his head.

H.D.A.M.

CIVILISATION ON TRIAL*

It is unlikely that many readers of the *Modern Churchman* will ever have time or opportunity to read Professor Toynbee's great work *A Study of History* (6 vols.), yet we know that thinkers as acute as Sir Ernest Barker have hailed this work as a unique contribution to human knowledge and its author as, perhaps, the greatest historian the world has ever known.

What is his verdict on the meaning of life and the lesson of history? In his latest volume *Civilisation on Trial*, Professor Toynbee gives us his conclusions.

With a severe mastery of his craft, Professor Toynbee unfolds the whole pageant of existence and with a few well chosen 'close-ups' indicates the key to the meaning of the whole. What a contrast to historians who drag us through a maze of imperfectly related detail and, at the end of it, can see only 'one emergency following upon another as wave follows wave!'¹

It is, of course, a dangerously easy thing to make a premature synthesis and impose upon history a pattern of our own creation. But that is just what Professor Toynbee has not done. His knowledge, as Sir Ernest Barker has written, has 'the most encyclopaedic range of our generation' and his work 'dwarfs everything of the kind which has ever been published before'.

Here, then, is a picture of the world by an artist with an unrivalled knowledge of the trees, a theory based on the most impressive analysis of the facts that the world has ever seen.

* *Civilisation on Trial*, by Prof. Arnold J. Toynbee (O.U. Press, 12/6. 263 pp. 1948).

¹ *A History of Europe*, by H. A. L. Fisher, p.v.

Civilisation on Trial is itself supremely civilised. It is a delight to read. There is something unhurried, friendly and intimate about it as it whisks one courteously from Ur to New York.

A feature of the book is its sense of perspective. It is not overburdened with facts, yet one knows that the author has in his mind as he writes the detailed history of every civilisation from the Hittite to the Japanese—and the relationships between them as well.

One of Dr. Toynbee's themes is the danger of the insularity of our knowledge of history. The civilisations, he maintains, are practically contemporary and closely inter-related.

Occasionally he steps back and shows us the time-chart of the evolutionary process, a chart on which a thousand years is a period too small to be indicated and the latest significant idea is Christianity. The book is not overburdened by geological terminology or astronomical figures, but it is evident that Professor Toynbee studies human history with the constant consciousness that the earth is a planet of a minor star in the Milky Way and that the Milky Way is one of many galaxies of unthinkable extent.

The book begins by stressing the comparative contemporaneity of civilisations and the value of a classical background in preventing 'the canonisation of the history of the particular country in which one happened to have been born'.

A true view of history can only be derived from the comparison of each civilisation, its genesis and the cause of its decline. In opposition to Spengler's determinism, Professor Toynbee favours a harmonisation of the cyclic theory and the prophetic belief that history is the 'masterful and progressive execution, on the narrow stage of this world, of a divine plan', the knowledge of which is born from suffering.

The cyclic or rhythmic rise and fall of civilisations teach the lessons of life, positive ones by what success they achieve and negative ones by their failures. As they rise, fall and give place to others

'some purposeful enterprise may all the time be making headway and, in a divine plan, the learning that comes from the suffering caused by the failures of civilisations may be the sovereign means of progress'.

Of the present point in history, Professor Toynbee writes that our two greatest enemies are war and class. Of these diseases every civilisation has died. He illustrates this with typical brilliance, ranging from Tut-ankh-Amen to the American Civil War, and then poses the question, 'what shall we do to be saved?' His answer is as follows:

1. In politics, establish international world government.
2. In economics, find a compromise between free enterprise and State Communism.
3. In the life of the spirit, put the secular super-structure back onto religious foundations.

Of these tasks he judges the political to be the most urgent and the religious 'by far the most important'. He adds that the world, now one physically, is certainly about to be united politically. The question is—by agreement or by the 'forcible imposition' of a new *Pax Romana*?

Professor Toynbee's brilliant survey of Russian history is intensely interesting. He traces the Soviet sense of mission, 'election' and infallibility from the Byzantine totalitarianism of the 'Holy Russia' of Ivan III, and an account of the mission and message of Islam. This is illustrated by the two ways in which technical superiority can be faced—by primitive attack ('Zealotism') or imitation (Herodianism). Dr. Toynbee thinks that Islam has a great spiritual contribution to make if it avoids these reactions and is stimulated

to creative activity. He admires the monotheism of Islam and its transcendence of racial differences. It is a pity that he does not also comment on Islam's weaknesses which make many to-day feel it can have little future—its attitude towards women and an infallible Koran². He suggests that to the historian of 5047 the most important thing happening to-day will be the beginnings of counter-influence of Islamic, Hindu and Far Eastern civilisations on our own. 'For religion, after all, is the serious business of the human race.'

So writes our paramount historian, and it is with growing excitement that the reader turns to the next and greatest of the lectures 'Christianity and Civilisation'.

It begins by attacking Gibbon's view of the relationship between Christianity and Graeco-Roman civilisation, the view that Christianity disrupted and destroyed the Antonine Roman Peace. Professor Toynbee shows that the Decline and Fall had become inevitable before the foundation of Christianity. The Graeco-Roman civilisation 'committed suicide before the fifth century B.C. was out'.

Gibbon's erroneous view was shared by Sir James Frazer, who connected religion with an other-worldliness destructive of those civic virtues on which civilisations are based.

Another theory is that Christianity is the 'chrysalis' between the 'caterpillar' of Graeco-Roman and Syrian Civilisation and the 'butterflies'—the civilisations of Byzantium and the West.

Professor Toynbee thinks the 'chrysalis' element does exist in the institutional side of the Christian Church, but the 'chrysalis' theory, which makes Religion the handmaid of civilisation, he rejects, disproving it by showing how a higher religion is by no means a necessary link between a dying civilisation and a nascent one. There was none, for example, between Minoa and Graeco-Rome.

A third view is now propounded. It is startling and daring. *It is that civilisation is subsidiary to the growth of religion.*

'If religion is a chariot, it looks as if the wheels on which it mounts towards heaven may be the periodic downfalls of civilisations on earth. It looks as if the movement of civilisations may be cyclic and recurrent while the movement of religion may be on a single, continuous upward line.'

We can agree with this, even though we see breaks and zig-zags in the 'upward line'. The Professor is, after all, standing well back from his canvas.

On this view of History, Western Civilisation is forced to humble itself. It has, indeed, failed even to achieve the subsidiary value of helping Christianity to realise itself, for it has been guilty of a 'pernicious backsliding'. It has been guilty of 'Leviathan-worship' which is 'sheer idolatry'. It has produced Communism, 'a leaf from the book of Christianity torn out and misread'. Another torn-out leaf from that book is Democracy, which has been 'divorced from its Christian context and secularised'. We are living on spiritual capital—Christian practice without Christian belief—and it is a wasting asset.

A further re-evaluation follows. If our present civilisation is so little significant, then

'the greatest new event will not be the monotonous rise of yet another secular civilisation out of the bosom of the Christian Church . . . it will

² c.f. *Basic Christianity*, p. 17.

still be the Crucifixion and its spiritual consequences'. Seen on the geological time-scale, Christianity is, after all, very recent, 'the most recent significant event in history'.³

Dr. Toynbee does not identify the survival of the Christian Religion with the survival of our Western Civilisation.

'If our secular Western Civilisation perishes, Christianity may be expected not only to endure but to grow in wisdom and stature as a result of a fresh experience of secular catastrophe.'

But Western Civilisation, even if it fails to make itself otherwise significant may serve one great historical purpose. The *Pax Romana* was significant because St. Paul used its trade-routes. So Western secular civilisation may serve a purpose 'by providing Christianity with a completely world-wide repetition of the Roman Empire to spread over'. Eventually, Professor Toynbee considers,

'when Caesar's empire falls again into its inevitable decay, Christianity may be left as the spiritual heir of all the other higher Religions from . . . the worship of Tammaz and Ishtar to those now living . . . and of all the philosophies from Ikhnaten's to Hegel's; while the Christian Church may be left as the social heir of all the other churches and all the civilisations.'

More wonderful still, Professor Toynbee proceeds to discuss the relationship between the Christian Church and the Kingdom of Heaven.

This passage has weaknesses. He does not say what he means by the Church. By the 'Kingdom of Heaven' or 'of God' (he uses the terms interchangeably) he means, as the Lord's Prayer implies, 'where God's will is done'.

When, he asks, the Church does enter into its inheritance, will the Kingdom of God have come? His answer is 'no'. The Church Triumphant may have appeared on earth, but the possibility of evil will remain unless and until some 'moral mutation' occurs in human nature. And 'there will always be Caesar's things to render unto Caesar . . . Caesar will always have work to do'.

The Professor implies that this necessity for a State will preclude the Kingdom of God. Does he then think that, even if the Church can never quite be the Kingdom of God, it ought to try to be?

It is not rather true that the Church is an *instrument*, and a very human and fallible one, with the divine purpose of the *establishment* of the Kingdom of God?

If God's will were done, the Kingdom of God would have fully come on earth even if Caesar were still necessary as a watchdog.

In the Roman Catholic Church Professor Toynbee sees 'two fundamental institutions, the Man and the Hierarchy'. This is a great pity. Neither is to be found (in the Mediaeval-Roman sense) in the New Testament and certainly not in the Religion of Jesus. In fact, much that is essential to Christianity and which would commend Christianity as a world religion has been obscured by these institutions. But Dr. Major's Hibbert Lectures⁴ had not been published when Professor Toynbee wrote.

³ In *Living Under Tension*, p. 15, Dr. H. E. Fosdick does work out such a time chart. It is most illuminating. Here it is:

Let the age of the Earth=50 years.

Then: Agriculture was discovered last year; writing began 6 months ago; Christianity began 2 months ago; electricity was discovered 24 hours ago; attempts to organise world peace began 2 minutes ago.

⁴ *Civilisation and Religious Values*, by H. D. A. Major, Allen and Unwin, 7/6; 1948. 140 pp. c.f. Lecture III. Hibbert Lectures, 1946 delivered in the Universities of Cambridge, Manchester and Bristol.

The Professor now turns to the relation between Christianity and Progress. Frazer believed that spiritual and social values were antithetic, a theory which makes life 'a tragedy without *catharsis*'. Toynbee believes that Sir James Frazer is wrong. Seeking God directly and seeking God in His children, is a social act. It is also 'the way of salvation'.

'The human soul that is truly seeking to save itself is as fully social a being as the ant-like Spartan or the bee-like Communist.' But he is a citizen, not of Leviathan but of the Kingdom of God.

Progress then, consists in the gradual establishment of a society in which a growing fund of 'illumination' and 'grace' will be attainable by an even greater number. Thus it is the Christian Religion which gives meaning to 'progress' and significance to History!

Professor Toynbee concludes by discussing the meaning of history for the soul. He rejects the 'this-worldly view' which makes the individual a cog in the State machine. This 'Leviathan-worship' he denounces as a 'moral enormity'. He rejects also the world-renouncing view of the Buddhist. He believes the evidence suggests that the world is meant to be 'a province of the Kingdom of God' and that the tragedy of man is his technical cleverness and his bungling of his relationship with God and therefore his relationship to his fellows. Improvement of our social heritage in terms of the spiritual life of mankind is the purpose of the whole vast historical process.

Christian teachers have, of course, been saying this for generations—but to find it as the conclusion of such a giant among historians is a moving experience.

N. S. POWER.

ENGLISH CHRISTIANITY

How many are the volumes that have been written on English Church history. The two latest of these are *England's Churches*¹ by H. A. L. Jefferson and *A History of Christianity in England*² by Professor E. O. James.

The Rev. H. A. L. Jefferson deals with the 'Rise and Witness' of all our chief denominations except the Roman Catholic. Curiously enough he omits to state the precise cause of the Roman schism in Elizabeth's reign. This papal schism was caused by the excommunication of the Queen in 1570. Her royal father had been excommunicated in 1533 and had died excommunicated. But after the restoration of papal supremacy by Mary in 1553, and its acceptance by Parliament, English Churchmen were restored to communion with the Pope and, after Mary's death, continued in the earlier years of Elizabeth's reign to attend their parish churches. In 1570, however, a Papal Bull definitely created the Roman Catholic schismatic body in England by forbidding the English adherents of the Papacy to attend their parish churches under penalty of excommunication.

Mr. Jefferson writes as a Liberal and a loyal member of the Church of England. He is in full sympathy with the nonconformist bodies whose devotion to their Christian ideals and practices compel them conscientiously to separate from the National Church. Had that Church been more reasonably

¹ *England's Churches: Their Rise and Witness*, by H. A. L. Jefferson (Rockliff, London, 1948; 10/6).

² *A History of Christianity in England*, by the Rev. Professor E. O. James, M.A., D.Litt., Ph.D., D.D., F.S.A. (Hutchinson & Co., 1949; 7/6).

tolerant in its policy and more Christian in its spirit these unhappy divisions would either never have occurred or would have been far less vigorous and successful.

Mr. Jefferson's volume exhibits his wide reading and a real understanding of our noblest Anglican classics, too little known and read to-day even by the more educated of the English clergy. In his concluding chapter, 'The Next Step,' Mr. Jefferson discusses with insight and optimism the crucial issue: 'How will organized religion react to the fact of ever-increasing knowledge, and an ever-changing background of thought?'

We turn now to *Christianity in England* by Professor E. O. James. Professor James is well known as an able writer on anthropology. In this sphere his function has not been original research but lucid exposition of the significance of the results which anthropology has secured. His gifts of lucid exposition are strikingly manifest in his volume on the Christian Religion in England. In his ecclesiastical affinities Dr. James is a Liberal Anglo-Catholic, but as a Liberal he does justice to ecclesiastical schools and movements with which he is not in entire sympathy. He begins as an anthropologist should, with a graphic account of Christian origins in Britain, but what, however, is more valuable is that he brings his history of English Christianity right down to the period following on the Second World War. We may be pardoned, therefore, if we exemplify the quality of this book from its twentieth-century criticism and conclusions. He is of opinion that it was in 1910, with the translation of Schweitzer's book into English, that the English Liberal conception of Jesus and His Gospel received its death blow. He writes:

'Not only did Schweitzer dispose of the "Jesus of history" as a social reformer and teacher of ethics, but he substituted for the earlier Modernist interpretation of Christ an apocalyptic theory. For him, our Lord was the forerunner of the Messiah who endeavoured to force God to set up His Kingdom in a catastrophic divine intervention but died on the Cross disillusioned and defeated.' (p. 173.)

This amazing misinterpretation of the Jesus of history, so widely accepted forty years ago, is to-day on its last legs. To-day, Schweitzer is pre-eminent, not as a critic of the Gospels, but as a great Christian missionary who had demonstrated that what the world needs is loyalty to the Spirit of Jesus although combined with little historic certainty about the details of His earthly life.

Of the future of English Christianity Dr. James declines to be dogmatic. He writes:

'With all traditions, ideologies and theologies in a state of disintegration it is impossible to predict with any degree of precision the shape of things to come. So far as Anglicanism is concerned, the three schools that have dominated the Communion during the last century give every appearance of having played their parts, at any rate for the time being, and while each has made a permanent contribution to the Church it has served with zeal and devotion, the future does not seem very likely to lie with any one to the exclusion of the others. Indeed, Evangelicalism, Anglo-Catholicism and Modernism at the moment are equally spent forces as the spear-heads of a religious revival in this country. Whether the present evangelistic efforts will meet with more success than the ill-fated "National Mission of Repentance and Hope" in 1916, time will prove.'" (p. 176.)

H.D.A.M.

A HELP TO BIBLE STUDY*.

How did the Bible come into being? How and why are we to read it to-day? These are questions which the Bishop of London seeks to answer in *The Authority of the Scriptures*,* and he does so admirably. In a clear and very readable style he describes how the Bible appears from the standpoint of modern criticism, the date and character of its various books, and how the canon of Scripture was gradually formed. He proceeds to show in what sense it may be called the word of God and what is the nature of its authority.

'It would be absurd to say that we are required to confine ourselves exclusively to the Scriptures. What we can say is that we are required to adopt no standards that are contrary to those of the Scriptures. If our Lord said, 'I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life', it implies that all goodness, truth, and beauty must be consonant with His character and teaching. In that sense He is the authoritative and absolute standard . . . The point is surely that Jesus does speak to us again in every discovery of truth, goodness, and beauty, but that we should not recognise it as the voice of Jesus unless we had the clue of revelation in our hand . . .

'The authority of the Scriptures, then,' the Bishop concludes, 'is neither exclusive nor universal, nor compulsive. It proceeds by reason and affection. It is limited. It confines itself to the sphere of religion and morals and it is glad to be reinforced by other interests and conclusions affecting the whole personality.' (pp. 112, 113, 115).

Primarily we are to read the Bible in order to learn what the writer of any given part was attempting to say, although—

'It is, of course, always possible that a great genius, such as a first-rate poet, may convey more than he consciously intends. He may be dealing with a particular situation but so understand and express the truth of it that he opens a door upon the eternal verities . . . Nevertheless, even in such a case we should naturally wish to grasp the full meaning of his words first in relation to their original context. It is only so that we can guard against . . . downright misinterpretation. So it is with the Bible.' (p. 71).

A literal understanding of it is, therefore, 'the one safe method of Biblical interpretation'. (p. 81). But other methods—the moral and allegorical—may also be used, especially when the literal meaning is hard to discover. But Dr. Wand adds a severe warning against pushing these too far:

'It is worth noticing that after a period of comparative quiescence, the system of typology is once again being tried by certain scholars, particularly in Oxford . . . The fact that the commentators can establish little agreement among themselves, and that the same commentator will often change his mind as to the precise nature of the type intended, is sufficient to give us pause before accepting this as a valuable method for modern use . . . Types and allegories . . . may, indeed, be quite valuable for homiletic purposes. But it should be obvious that no doctrine or historical thesis may be built upon them. Otherwise the door would be open to every crank and charlatan with an imagination quick enough to seize upon any fortuitous resemblance between a Biblical text and his own favourite nostrum for healing the ills of the world.' (pp. 80-81).

Even for its literary merits alone, the Bible should be familiar to us.

'Not to know the Bible is to show oneself an uneducated person.

* *The Authority of the Scriptures*, by J. W. C. Wand, Bishop of London (Mowbray, 1949; 5/-).

Without some knowledge of it we cannot understand the finest European literature. It is woven into the very texture of our thought.' (p. 92).

And from reading it for its general and literary interest, we are to go on to study it and meditate upon it until we see that—

'It has a word for us in every sorrow, it redoubles every joy, it offers counsel in every doubt, and it gives warning to every wayward wanderer. It is the instruction of the young, the strength of the mature, the comfort of the aged. In its mirrors young men can see visions and old men dream dreams. It opens the path of new life to the recovered sinner and brightens the path of every pilgrim to the promised land.' (pp. 118-119).

There are one or two points upon which the Bishop's opinion may be questioned. For example, it may be thought that he draws too rigid a distinction between the divine relation within the Bible and that same revelation outside it (chap. vii); and that the authority of the Church as the interpreter of Scripture is too unreservedly maintained. Is it really true that 'normally, at least, the one will find that wisdom lies with the many' as we are told on p. 117?

But these are details, though important ones. As an elementary guide to the Bible this succinct and lucid little book should prove to be of very considerable value.

D. L. SCOTT

PEBMARSH PARISH*

Pebmarsh Church, Essex, by its Rector, who is President of the Essex Archaeological Society, is indeed a work of love and learning. Its production must have occupied years of research and is an example to country incumbents of what can be achieved in the sphere of local history.

Pebmarsh Church belongs mainly to the Decorated and Perpendicular periods of church architecture when parish church building was at its height in England. The details of parish life as recorded by Mr. Bayley, although not unusual in general, are extremely interesting in detail. The description he transcribes of church music about 1848 recalls Hardy's *Under the Greenwood Tree*:

'Tribes of schoolchildren sat in the gallery at the west end and formed the choir, and there were five or six men in front who played the 'cello, flute, violin, double bass and concertina. Only the hymns and metrical version of the psalms were sung, and the congregation turned round and faced the west gallery during the singing of them. A barrel organ was afterwards given by the rector and placed in the gallery, played (or ground) by the schoolmaster. This lasted until the finger-organ I played was got in 1861.' (p. 48.)

In the eighteenth century there was only one service every Sunday. In 1834 the services were twice every Sunday, at 11 and 3 o'clock, and the Sacrament was administered at Easter, Trinity, Michaelmas and Christmas (not Whitsunday, which is the usual custom).

'The Death Knell is rung 12 or 24 hours after death; three for a man, two for a woman, one for a child.'

Three, six and nine times are more usual for the Death Knell: hence the saying, 'Nine tailors make a man.'

The list of Churchwardens begins in 1662. The list of Rectors in 1254. The patrons of the parish have been varied, including a Plantagenet Duke of Clarence and Charles I. Since 1662 the patrons have been the Grimston family, now Earls of Verulam.

The volume possesses some beautifully executed illustrations.

H.D.A.M.

* *Pebmarsh Church, Essex*, by T. D. S. Bayley, M.A. (O.U.P., 1946; 8/6, by post 9/6).

CORRESPONDENCE

THE BRAINS TRUST AND REINCARNATION

SIR,

May I offer some brief comments on the answers of the Brains Trust to the question: 'What lies behind the doctrine of Reincarnation, etc.?'

Mr. Snape's account was admirable in respect of the theory as found in Hinyana Buddhism; but it is found in Mahayana Buddhism and in Hinduism in other forms and with an emphasis on continuity which makes it more commendable to Western minds. It is in the form favoured by Modern Hindu thinkers like Radhakrishnan and Sri Aurobindo that reputable Western thinkers such as McTaggart, Macneile Dixon, Charles Eliot, Douglas Fawcett and others have found it a reasonable speculation.

Certainly Reincarnation is not a Christian doctrine. But it does not follow that it cannot be fitted into a Christian scheme of thought, unless we adhere to a scholastic type of theology. Thirty years ago I heard the late Dr. F. S. M. Bennett, then Dean of Chester, proclaim his belief in Reincarnation and affirm that he could combine it rationally with his Christian faith. Two years before his recent death I asked him if he still adhered to that statement, and he replied that nothing had occurred to make him modify it.

The statement that Reincarnation 'was condemned in 540 A.D.' surely requires some modification. Origen's peculiar doctrines of pre-existence were condemned by a local Council or Synod about 543, and the condemnation may have been repeated by the Ecumenical Council of Constantinople in 553. But neither Reincarnation nor other notions of pre-existence came under conciliar consideration.

Of course Reincarnation is an hypothesis rather than an ascertained truth. As such it ranks with much that is regarded as essential 'Christian truth', if the support of infallible authority be ruled out. Not a few thoughtful Christians are disturbed by the obvious fact that, whereas their religion proclaims a redemption for the whole world, that redemption, if available only in one experience of earthly life, does not and cannot reach more than a small fraction of the world's inhabitants. It is the love of God, as well as His justice, that seems to be at stake. At the same time, if you try to vindicate the love of God by postulating 'a second chance' beyond death, you appear to put a lower dignity and value on earthly experience than the religious consciousness discerns in it.

RALPH GARDNER.

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PRE-EXISTENCE AND REINCARNATION

SIR,

I agree with the general verdict of the Brains Trust that Reincarnation has no place in the Gospel of Jesus Christ; but I do not feel it was adequately or even fairly discussed.

Mr. Snape seemed to imply that this doctrine is practically confined to the Far East. This is quite untrue. A belief in Reincarnation has been in the past, and is indeed at the present day, widely held in the West: The Ancient Egyptians; the Celtic Druids in Gaul; Pythagoras and his school in Ancient Greece; Cicero, Seneca, Virgil and Ovid in Ancient Rome; Justin, Clement of Alexandria and Origen among the Christian Fathers; all accepted it. Admittedly it was forgotten in the Middle Ages and ignored by Shakespeare; but Henry More and Joseph Glanvil both defended it in the 17th century.

Mr. Hardwick skates too lightly over the vital question of the relevance of Pre-existence and Reincarnation to the facts of life. For, after all, they provide one of the most satisfactory explanations of such problems as 'human suffering' and 'the lack of, or over-abundant opportunities', or the existence of otherwise inexplicable 'genius', 'love at first sight', etc.

Finally, you Sir, declare that this belief cannot fit into the Christian scheme of Salvation, because it lays no stress on 'the Judgment' and lacks a note of urgency. But large numbers of so-called Christians in this country to-day do not really believe in a sudden salvation or a final judgment. They are thinking rather along the lines of the need for self-judgment and working out one's own salvation.

The doctrine of Reincarnation is no world-refusing creed. It rather expresses a deep-seated instinct in the human heart to complete in this world the work you have begun here. It supplies an escape from Cecil Rhodes' death-bed lament, 'So much to do . . . So little done.' It justifies the fierce retort of Browning's Gramscarian: 'What's Time? Leave NOW for dogs and apes! Man has forever.'

A. TINDAL HART.

The Rectory, Blatherwycke, Peterborough.

SIR,

In the first place the questioner appears to think that religious beliefs can be divided into truth or hypothesis. Surely the Christian beliefs regarding immortality can only be classed as hypotheses. To ask the question 'Is the doctrine of reincarnation a truth or a hypothesis?' presupposes knowledge which rests only with God. Only those fortunate souls who have or claim to have a direct divine revelation can separate the two—and what they say we do well to receive with caution.

Many people who call themselves Christians believe in Reincarnation, and I was deeply thankful that Dr. Major's third permissible theory of the origin of each human soul was mentioned and that he apparently left the door wide open for discussion.

I am a communicant member of the Church of England, but Reincarnation has provided me with a key to many problems and difficulties which the Church so far as I am aware leaves unanswered.

It is a real disaster that the Church will not examine the theory of Reincarnation—but prefers to shut its eyes to any hypothesis however reasonable which is not blessed by the tradition of orthodoxy.

JOHN WALKER.